



ed. by Mary Ellen Waithe and Ruth Hagengruber

Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists Paderborn University, Germany

Judging in Hannah Arendt (1905–1975)

Elizabeth Minnich

American Association of Colleges and Universities

Arendt's interest in the art of *judgment* concerned especially how it lets us say of a particular action, *This* is good, of a historical event, *This* is important. Comparing it to *taste*, by which connoisseurs say, *This is beautiful* but cannot prove it, Arendt holds that judging "has nothing in common with logical operations" (Arendt 1971: 215). If we are not then reduced to subjective assertions, how does this mysterious ability work? By what, if not objective or subjective standards, do we judge?

Arendt is concerned with how we answer for political as well as epistemological reasons. Importantly, to disagree with a valid deduction or a subjective pronouncement is to be in error, deviant, or foolish. However, disagreement is unavoidable and, for Arendt, desirable in a free public life where we encounter the paradoxical human condition that we "are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else" (Arendt 1958: 8).

But is this not an admission that, without general principles applied logically to individuals, public life would be chaotic? No: although different, if we are free to communicate our thinking publicly, we develop *inter*-subjectivity, imagination, and a "Common Sense" (Arendt 1971: 267) that give us shareable standards for persuasive, not coercive, judgment. Especially appropriate, Arendt says, are the common *exemplars* (such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosa Parks/courageous change-makers) that emerge as we judge who and what appears in the stories we tell about who we are.

Thus judgment, "the by-product" of thinking that dissolves certainties, sending us out to talk with others, emerges as "perhaps the most political of all man's mental abilities" (Arendt 1971: 188).

Primary Sources:

Arendt, Hannah 1958. The human condition, second edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

_____ 1968. *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought.* New York: The Viking Press

_____ 1971.Thinking and moral considerations, in: Kohn, Jerome (ed.): *Responsibility* and judgment. 2003. New York: Schocken Books.

_____ 1971. *The life of the mind, Volume I: Thinking, Volume II: Willing.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

_____ 1982. *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy*, edited, with an introduction by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

_____ 1994. Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil, revised and enlarged edition. New York: Penguin Books.

Secondary Sources:

- Canovan, Margaret 1974. The political thought of Hannah Arendt. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York and London.
- Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1992. Arendt, Camus, and modern rebellion. Yale University Press: New Haven & London.
- Minnich, Elizabeth 1989. To judge in freedom: Hannah Arendt on the relation of thinking and morality, in Kaplan & Kessler (eds.): *Hannah Arendt: thinking, judging, freedom.* Allen & Unwin: Wellington, London, Boston.
- Minnich, Elizabeth 2002. Thinking with Hannah Arendt: An Introduction, in: International journal of philosophical studies, Vol. 10 (2), 123–130. URL: http://www.tandf.co.ukjournal [10|07|2018].
- *Villa, Dana* 1999. *Politics, philosophy, terror: essays on the thought of Hannah Arendt.* Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.

Keywords:

judging, judgment, reflective judgment, common sense, intersubjectivity, Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosa Parks