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The Present State Of The War, And The Necessity of an Augmentation,
Considered.

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THE
PRESENT STATE

OF THE
WAR,

AND THE

Necessity of an Augmentation, Considered.



NEW YORK
1784

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES

W A R
AND THE
NECESSITY OF AN AUGMENTATION
OF THE ARMY

P R E F A C E.

THE Author of the following Essay has endeavoured to draw into one continued scheme the whole state of the present war, and the methods that appear to him the most proper for bringing it to a happy conclusion.

After having considered that the French are the constant and most dangerous enemies to the British nation, and that the danger from them is now greater than ever, and will still increase till their present Union with Spain be broken, he sets forth the several advantages which this Union has already given France, and taken from Great Britain, in relation to the West-Indies, the woollen manufacture, the trade of the Levant, and the naval power of the two nations.

He shews how these advantages will still rise higher after a peace, notwithstanding our present conquests, with new additions, should be confirmed to us; as well because the monarchy of Spain would not be weakened by such concessions, as because no Guarantee could be found sufficient to secure them to us. For which reasons he lays it down as a fixt Rule, that no peace is to be made without an entire disunion of the French and Spanish Monarchies.

That this may be brought about, he endeavours to prove from the progress we have already made towards it, and the successes we have purchased in the present war, which are very considerable if well pursued, but of no effect if we acquiesce in them.

In order to complete this disunion in which we have gone so far, he would not have us relie upon exhausting the French Treasury, attempts on the Spanish Indies, Descents on France, but chiefly upon out-numbring them in troops, France being already drained of her best supplies, and the confederates masters of much greater forces for multitude and strength, both in men and horse, and provided with Generals of greater fame and abilities.

He then considers the wrong measures we have hitherto taken in making too small levies after a successful campaign, in regulating their number by that of the enemies forces, and hiring them of our confederates; shewing

P R E F A C E.

at the same time the inconveniences we suffer from such hired troops, and several advantages we might receive from employing those of our own nation.

He further recommends this augmentation of our forces, to prevent the keeping up a standing body of them in times of peace, to enable us to make an impression on the Enemy in the present posture of the war, and to secure our selves against a Prince, who is now at the head of a powerful army, and has not yet declared himself.

In the last place, he answers by several considerations those two popular objections, That we furnish more towards the war than the rest of the Allies, and That we are not able to contribute more than we do already.

These are the most material heads of the following Essay, in which there are many other subordinate reflections that naturally grow out of so copious a subject.

November, 1707.



T H E

T H E
 PRESENT STATE *of the* W A R,
 A N D T H E
Necessity of an Augmentation, considered.

TH E *French* are certainly the most implacable, and the most dangerous enemies of the *British* nation. Their form of government, their religion, their jealousy of the *British* power, as well as their persecutions of commerce, and pursuits of universal Monarchy, will fix them for ever in their animosities and averfions towards us, and make them catch at all opportunities of subverting our constitution, destroying our religion, ruining our trade, and sinking the figure which we make among the nations of *Europe*: Not to mention the particular ties of honour that lie on their present King to impose on us a Prince, who must prove fatal to our country if he ever reigns over us.

As we are thus in a natural state of war, if I may so call it, with the *French* nation; it is our misfortune, that they are not only the most inveterate, but most formidable of our enemies; and have the greatest power, as well as the strongest inclination, to ruin us. No other state equals them in the force of their fleets and armies, in the nearness and conveniency of their situation, and in the number of friends and well-wishers, which, it is to be feared, they have among us.

For these reasons our wars with *France* have always affected us in our most tender interests, and concerned us more than those we have had with any other nation; but I may venture to say, this Kingdom was never yet engaged in a war of so great consequence, as that which now lies upon our hands. Our All is at stake, and irretrievably lost, if we fail of success. At other times, if a war ended in a dishonourable peace, or with equal loss, we could comfort our selves with the hopes of a more favourable juncture, that might set the balance right, or turn it to our advantage.

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We had still the prospect of forming the same alliance, or perhaps strengthening it with new confederacies, and by that means of trying our fortune a second time, in case the injustice or ambition of the enemy forced us into the field. At present, if we make a drawn game of it, or procure but moderate advantages, we are in a condition which every *British* heart must tremble at the thought of. There are no second tryals, no wars in reserve, no new schemes of alliance to which we can have recourse. Should the *French* King be able to bear down such an united force as now makes head against him, at a time when *Spain* affords him no greater assistance; what will he do when the trade of the *Levant* lies at his mercy; when the whole kingdom of *Spain* is supplied with his manufactures, and the wealth of the *Indies* flows into his coffers; and, what is yet worse, when this additional strength must arise in all its particulars from a proportionable decay in the States that now make war upon him? It is no wonder therefore that our late King of glorious memory, who, by the confession of his greatest enemies, was a Prince that perfectly understood the interests of *Europe*, should in his last speech recommend to his Parliament the declaring war against *France* in those memorable words: *You have yet an opportunity, by God's blessing, to secure to you and your posterity the quiet enjoyment of your religion and liberties, if you are not wanting to your selves, but will exert the ancient vigour of the English nation: but I tell you plainly, my opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this occasion, you have no reason to hope for another.*

We have already a dreadful proof of the increase of power that accrues to *France* from its conjunction with *Spain*. So expensive a war as that which the *French* Monarchy hath been carrying on in so many and so remote parts at once, must long since have drained and exhausted all its substance, had there not been several secret springs, that swelled their treasury from time to time, in proportion as the war has sunk it. The King's coffers have been often reduced to the lowest ebb, but have still been seasonably refreshed by frequent and unexpected supplies from the *Spanish America*. We hear indeed of the arrival but of very few ships from those parts; but as in every vessel there is stowage for immense treasures, when the cargo is pure Bullion, or merchandise of as great a value; so we find by experience they have had such prodigious sums of money conveyed to them by these secret chanel, that they have been enabled to pay more numerous armies, than they ever had on foot before; and that at a time when their trade fails in all its other branches, and is distressed by all the arts and contrivances of their neighbouring nations.

During

During the last four years, by a modest computation, there have been brought into *Brest* above six millions of pounds sterling in bullion. What then shall we suppose wou'd be the effect of this correspondence with *America*, might the wealth of those parts come to them on squadrons of men of war, and fleets of galeons? If these little by-currents, that creep into the country by stealth, have so great a force, how shall we stem the whole torrent, when it breaks in upon us with its full violence? and this certainly will be our case, unless we find a means to dissolve the union between *France* and *Spain*. I have dwelt the longer on this consideration, because the present war hath already furnished us with the experiment, and sensibly convinced us of the increase of power, which *France* has received from its intercourse with the *Spanish West-Indies*.

As there are many who look upon every thing which they do not actually see and feel as bare probability and speculation, I shall only touch on those other reasons of which we have already had some experience, for our preventing this coalition of interests and designs in the two monarchies.

The Woollen manufacture is the *British* strength, the staple commodity and proper growth of our country; if this fails us, our trade and estates must sink together, and all the cash of the nation be consumed on foreign merchandize. The *French* at present gain very much upon us in this great article of our trade, and since the accession of the *Spanish* monarchy, supply with cloth, of their own making, the very best mart we had in *Europe*. And what a melancholy prospect have we, if ever a peace gives them leave to enrich their manufacture with mixtures of *Spanish* wool to multiply the hands employed in it, to improve themselves in all the niceties of the art, and to vend their wares in those places where was the greatest consumption of our woollen works, and the most considerable gain for the *British* merchant. Notwithstanding our many seasonable recruits from *Portugal*, and our plantations, we already complain of our want of bullion; and must at last be reduced to the greatest exigencies, if this great source be dried up, and our traffick with *Spain* continue under its present discouragement.

The trade of the *Levant* must likewise flourish or decay in our hands, as we are friends or enemies of the *Spanish* monarchy. The late conquest of *Naples* will very little alter the case, though *Sicily* should follow the fate of her sister kingdom. The *Streight's* mouth is the key of the *Levant*, and will be always in the possession of those who are Kings of *Spain*. We may only add, that the same causes which straiten the
British

British commerce, will naturally enlarge the *French*; and that the naval force of either nation will thrive or languish in the same degree as their commerce gathers or loses strength. And if so powerful and populous a nation as that of *France* become superior to us by sea, our whole is lost, and we are no more a people. The consideration of so narrow a channel betwixt us, of such numbers of regular troops on the enemy's side, of so small a standing force on our own, and that too in a country destitute of all such forts and strong places as might stop the progress of a victorious army, hath something in it so terrifying, that one does not care for setting it in its proper light. Let it not therefore enter into the heart of any one that hath the least zeal for his religion, or love of liberty, that hath any regard either to the honour or safety of his country, or a well-wish for his friends or posterity, to think of a peace with *France*, till the *Spanish* monarchy be entirely torn from it, and the house of *Bourbon* disabled from ever giving the law to *Europe*.

Let us suppose that the *French* King would grant us the most advantageous terms we can desire; without the separation of the two monarchies they must infallibly end in our destruction. Should he secure to us all our present acquisitions; should he add two or three frontier-towns to what we have already in *Flanders*; should he join the kingdoms of *Sicily* and *Sardinia* to *Milan* and *Naples*; should he leave King *Charles* in the peaceable possession of *Catalonia*; should he make over to *Great Britain* the town and harbour of *Cadiz*, as well as that of *Gibraltar*, and at the same time resign his conquests in *Portugal*; it would all be of no effect towards the common safety of *Europe*, while the bulk of the *Spanish* continent and the riches of *America* remain in the possession of the *Bourbon* family.

Boccalini when he weighs the States of *Europe* in his political balance, after having laid *France* in one scale, throws *Spain* into the other, which wanted but very little of being a counter-poise. The *Spaniards* upon this, says he, begun to promise themselves the honour of the ballance; reckoning that if *Spain* of it self weighed so well, they could not fail of success when the several parts of the monarchy were lumped in the same scale. Their surprize was very great when upon the throwing in of *Naples* they saw the scale rise, and was greater still when they found that *Milan* and *Flanders* had the same effect. The truth of it is, these parts of the *Spanish* monarchy are rather for ornament than strength. They furnish out Vice-royalties for the *Grandees*, and posts of honour for the noble families; but in a time of war are incumbrances to the main body of the kingdom,

kingdom, and leave it naked and exposed by the great number of hands they draw from it to their defence. Should we therefore continue in the possession of what we have already made our selves masters, with such additions as have been mentioned, we should have little more than the excrescencies of the *Spanish* monarchy. The strength of it will still join it self to *France*, and grow the closer to it by its disunion from the rest. And in this case the advantages which must arise to that people from their intimate alliance with the remaining part of the *Spanish* dominions, would in a very few years not only repair all the damages they have sustained in the present war, but fill the kingdom with more riches than it hath yet had in its most flourishing periods.

The *French* King hath often entered on several expensive projects, on purpose to dissipate the wealth that is continually gathering in his coffers in times of peace. He hath employed immense sums on architecture, gardening, water-works, painting, statuary, and the like, to distribute his treasures among his people, as well as to humour his pleasures and his ambition: but if he once engrosses the commerce of the *Spanish Indies*, whatever quantities of gold and silver stagnate in his private coffers, there will be still enough to carry on the circulation among his subjects. By this means in a short space of time he may heap up greater wealth than all the Princes of *Europe* joined together; and in the present constitution of the world, wealth and power are but different names for the same thing. Let us therefore suppose that after eight or ten years of peace, he hath a mind to infringe any of his treaties, or invade a neighbouring State; to revive the pretensions of *Spain* upon *Portugal*, or attempt the taking those places which were granted us for our security; what resistance, what opposition can we make to so formidable an enemy? Should the same alliance rise against him that is now in war with him, what could we hope for from it, at a time when the States engaged in it will be comparatively weakened, and the enemy who is now able to keep them at a stand, will have received so many new accessions of strength.

But I think it is not to be imagined that in such a conjuncture as we here suppose, the same confederates, or any other of equal force, could be prevailed upon to join their arms, and endeavour at the pulling down so exorbitant a power. Some might be bought into his interests by money, others drawn over by fear, and those that are liable to neither of these impressions, might not think their own interest so much concerned as in the present war; or if any appeared in a disposition to enter into such a confederacy, they might be crushed separately before they could concert measures for their mutual defence.

The keeping together of the present alliance can be ascribed to nothing else but the clear and evident conviction which every member of it is under, that if it should once break without having had its effect, they can never hope for another opportunity of reuniting, or of prevailing by all the joint efforts of such an union. Let us therefore agree on this as a fixt rule, and an inviolable maxim, never to lay down our arms against *France*, till we have utterly disjoyned her from the *Spanish* monarchy. Let this be the first step of a publick treaty, the basis of a general peace.

Had the present war indeed run against us, and all our attacks upon the enemy been vain, it might look like a degree of frenzy, or a mixture of obstinacy and despair, to be determined on so impracticable an undertaking. But on the contrary, we have already done a great part of our work, and are come within view of the end that we have been so long driving at. We remain victorious in all the seats of war. In *Flanders* we have got into our hands several open countries, rich towns, and fortified places. We have driven the enemy out of all his alliances, dispossessed him of his strong holds, and ruined his allies in *Germany*. We have not only recovered what the beginning of the war had taken from us, but possessed our selves of the kingdom of *Naples*, the dutchy of *Milan*, and the avenue of *France* in *Italy*. The *Spanish* war hath given us a haven for our ships, and the most populous and wealthy province of that kingdom. In short, we have taken all the outlying parts of the *Spanish* monarchy, and made impressions upon the very heart of it. We have beaten the *French* from all their advanced posts in *Europe*, and driven them into their last entrenchments. One vigorous push on all sides, one general assault will force the enemy to cry out for quarter, and surrender themselves at discretion. Another *Blenheim* or *Ramillies* will make the confederates masters of their own terms, and arbitrators of a peace.

But notwithstanding the advantages already gained are very considerable if we pursue them, they will be of no effect unless we improve them towards the carrying of our main point. The enemy staggers; if you follow your blow, he falls at your feet; but if you allow him respite, he will recover his strength, and come upon you with greater fury. We have given him several repeated wounds that have enfeebled him, and brought him low; but they are such as time will heal, unless you take advantage from his present weakness to redouble your attacks upon him. It was a celebrated part in *Caesar's* character, and what comes home to our present purpose, that he thought nothing at all was done, while any thing remained undone. In short, we have been tugging a great while
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against the stream, and have almost weathered our point; a stretch or two more will do the work; but if instead of that we slacken our arms, and drop our oars, we shall be hurried back in a moment to the place from whence we first set out.

After having seen the necessity of an entire separation of the kingdoms of *France* and *Spain*, our subject naturally leads us into the consideration of the most proper means for effecting it.

We have a great while flattered our selves with the prospect of reducing *France* to our own terms by the want of money among the people, and the exigencies of the publick treasury; but have been still disappointed by the great sums imported from *America*, and the many new expedients which the Court hath found out for its relief. A long consumptive war is more likely to break the grand alliance, than disable *France* from maintaining sufficient armies to oppose it. An arbitrary government will never want money, so long as the people have it; and so active a people will always have it, whilst they can send what merchandises they please to *Mexico* and *Peru*. The *French* since their alliance with *Spain* keep thirty ships in constant motion between the western ports of *France* and the south seas of *America*. The King himself is an adventurer in this traffick, and besides the share that he receives out of the gains of his subjects, has immense sums that come directly from it into his own hands.

We may further consider, that the *French* since their abandoning *Bavaria* and *Italy* have very much retrenched the expence of the war, and lay out among themselves all the money that is consumed in it.

Many are of opinion, that the most probable way of bringing *France* to reason would be by the making an attempt upon the *Spanish West-Indies*, and by that means to cut off all communication with this great source of riches, or turn the current of it into our own country. This I must confess carries so promising an appearance, that I would by no means discourage the attempt: but at the same time I think it should be a collateral project, rather than our principal design. Such an undertaking (if well concerted, and put into good hands) would be of infinite advantage to the common cause: but certainly an enterprize that carries in it the fate of *Europe*, should not turn upon the uncertainty of winds and waves, and be liable to all the accidents that may befall a naval expedition.

Others there are that have long deceived themselves with the hopes of an insurrection in *France*, and are therefore for laying out all our

strength on a descent. These, I think, do not enough consider the natural love which the gross of mankind have for the constitution of their fathers. A man that is not enlightened by travel or reflexion, grows as fond of arbitrary power, to which he hath been used from his infancy, as of cold climates or barren countries, in which he hath been born and bred. Besides, there is a kind of sluggish resignation, as well as poorness and degeneracy of spirit, in a state of slavery, that we meet with but very few who will be at the pains or danger of recovering themselves out of it; as we find in history instances of persons who after their prisons have been flung open, and their fetters struck off, have chosen rather to languish in their dungeons, than stake their miserable lives and fortunes upon the success of a revolution. I need not instance the general fate of descents, the difficulty of supplying men and provisions by sea against an enemy that hath both at hand, and without which it is impossible to secure those conquests that are often made in the first onsets of an invasion. For these and other reasons I can never approve the nursing up commotions and insurrections in the enemy's country, which for want of the necessary support are likely to end in the massacre of our friends and the ruin of their families.

The only means therefore for bringing *France* to our conditions, and what appears to me, in all human probability, a sure and infallible expedient, is to throw in multitudes upon them, and overpower them with numbers. Would the confederacy exert it self as much to annoy the enemy, as they themselves do for their defence, we might bear them down with the weight of our armies, and in one summer overfet the whole power of *France*.

The *French* monarchy is already exhausted of its best and bravest subjects. The flower of the nation is consumed in its wars: the strength of their armies consists at present of such as have saved themselves by flight from some or other of the victorious confederates; and the only proper persons to recruit them are but the refuse of those who have been already picked out for the service. *Mareschal de Vauban*, though infinitely partial in his calculations of the power of *France*, reckons that the number of its inhabitants was two millions less at the peace of *Ryswick*, than in the beginning of the war that was there concluded: and though that war continued nine years, and this hath as yet lasted but six, yet considering that their armies are more strong and numerous; that there hath been much more action in the present war; and that their losses sustained in it have been very extraordinary; we may, by a moderate

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rate computation, suppose that the present war hath not been less prejudicial than the foregoing one in the ravage which it has made among the people. There is in *France* so great a disproportion between the number of males and females; and among the former, between those who are capable of bearing arms, and such as are too young, sickly, or decrepit for the service; and at the same time such vast numbers of Ecclesiasticks, secular and religious, who live upon the labours of others, that when the several trades and professions are supplied, you will find most of those that are proper for war absolutely necessary for filling up the laborious part of life, and carrying on the underwork of the nation. They have already contributed all their superfluous hands, and every new levy they make must be at the expence of their farms and vineyards, their manufactures and commerce.

On the contrary, the grand Alliance have innumerable sources of recruits, not only in *Britain* and *Ireland*, the *United Provinces*, and *Flanders*; but in all the populous parts of *Germany* that have little trade or manufactures, in proportion to the number of their inhabitants. We may add, that the *French* have only *Switzerland*, besides their own country, to recruit in; and we know the difficulties they meet with in getting thence a single regiment: whereas the Allies have not only the same resource, but may be supplied for money from *Denmark* and other neutral States. In short, the Confederates may bring to the field what forces they please, if they will be at the charge of them: but *France*, let her wealth be what it will, must content herself with the product of her own country.

The *French* are still in greater streights for supplies of horse than men. The breed of their country is neither so good nor numerous as what are to be found in most of the countries of the Allies. They had last summer about threescore thousand in their several armies, and could not perhaps bring into the field thirty thousand more, if they were disposed to make such an augmentation.

The *French* horse are not only few, but weak in comparison of ours. Their cavalry in the battle of *Blenheim* could not sustain the shock of the *British* horse. For this reason our late way of attacking their troops sword in hand is very much to the advantage of our nation, as our men are more robust, and our horses of a stronger make than the *French*; and in such attacks it is the weight of the forces, supposing equal courage and conduct, that will always carry it. The *English* strength turned very much to account in our wars against the *French* of old, when we used
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to gall them with our long bows, at a greater distance than they could shoot their arrows: this advantage we lost upon the invention of fire-arms, but by the present method our strength as well as bravery may again be of use to us in the day of battle.

We have very great encouragement to send what numbers we are able into the field, because our Generals at present are such as are likely to make the best use of them, without throwing them away on any fresh attempts or ill-concerted projects. The Confederate armies have the happiness of being commanded by persons who are esteemed the greatest leaders of the present age, and are perhaps equal to any that have preceded them. There is a sort of resemblance in their characters; a particular sedateness in their conversation and behaviour, that qualifies them for council, with a great intrepidity and resolution that fits them for action. They are all of them men of concealed fire, that doth not break out with noise and heat in the ordinary circumstances of life; but shews it self sufficiently in all great enterprises that require it. It is true, the General upon the *Rhine* hath not had the same occasions as the other to signalize himself; but if we consider the great vigilance, activity and courage, with the consummate prudence, and the nice sense of honour which appears in that Prince's character, we have great reason to hope, that as he purchased the first success in the present war, by forcing into the service of the Confederates an army that was raised against them in the very heart of the Empire, he will give one of the finishing strokes to it, and help to conclude the great work which he so happily begun. The sudden check that he gave to the *French* army the last campaign, and the good order he established in that of the *Germans*, look like happy presages of what we may expect from his conduct. I shall not pretend to give any character of the Generals on the enemies side; but I think we may say this, that in the eyes of their own nation they are inferior to several that have formerly commanded the *French* armies. If then we have greater numbers than the *French*, and at the same time better Generals, it must be our own fault if we will not reap the fruit of such advantages.

It would be loss of time to explain any further our superiority to the enemy in numbers of men and horse. We see plainly that we have the means in our hands, and that nothing but the application of them is wanting. Let us only consider what use the enemy would make of the advantage we have mentioned, if it fell on their side; and is it not very strange that we should not be as active and industrious for our security, as they would

would certainly be for our destruction? But before we consider more distinctly the method we ought to take in the prosecution of the war, under this particular view, let us reflect a little upon those we have already taken in the course of it for these six years past.

The Allies after a successful summer are too apt, upon the strength of it, to neglect their preparations for the ensuing campaign, while the *French* leave no art nor stratagem untried to fill up the empty spaces of their armies, and swell them to an equal bulk with those of the Confederates. By this means our advantage is lost, and the fate of *Europe* brought to a second decision. It is now become an observation, that we are to expect a very indifferent year after a very successful one. *Blenheim* was followed by a summer that makes no noise in the war. *Ramillies*, *Turin*, and *Barcelona*, were the parents of our last campaign. So many dreadful blows alarmed the enemy, and raised their whole country up in arms. Had we on our side made proportionable preparations, the war by this time had been brought to a happy issue. If after having gained the great victories of *Blenheim* and *Ramillies*, we had made the same efforts as we should have done had we lost them, the power of *France* could not have withstood us.

In the beginning of the winter we usually get what intelligence we can of the force which the enemy intends to employ in the campaigns of the succeeding year, and immediately cast about for a sufficient number of troops to face them in the field of battle. This, I must confess, would be a good method if we were engaged in a defensive war. We might maintain our ground with an equal number of forces; but our business is not only to secure what we are already in possession of; we are to wrest the whole *Spanish* Monarchy out of the hands of the enemy; and in order to it, to work our way into the heart of his country by dint of arms. We should therefore put forth all our strength, and without having an eye to his preparations, make the greatest push that we are able on our own side. We are told that the enemy at present thinks of raising threescore thousand men for the next summer; if we regulate our levies in that view, we do nothing; let us perform our utmost, as they do, and we shall overwhelm them with our multitudes. We have it in our power at least to be four times as strong as the *French*, but if ten men are in war with forty, and the latter detach only an equal number to the engagement, what benefit do they receive from their superiority?

It seems therefore to be the business of the Confederates to turn to their advantage their apparent odds in men and horse; and by that means
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to out-number the enemy in all rencounters and engagements. For the same reason it must be for the interest of the Allies to seek all opportunities of battle, because all losses on the opposite side are made up with infinitely more difficulty than on ours; besides that the *French* do their business by lying still, and have no other concern in the war than to hold fast what they have already got into their hands.

The miscarriage of the noblest project that ever was formed in *Europe*, can be ascribed to nothing else but our want of numbers in the several quarters of the war. If our armies on all sides had begun to busie and insult the enemy, at the same time that the forces marched out of *Piemont*, *Toulon* had been at present in the hands of the Duke of *Savoy*. But could that Prince ever have imagined that the *French* would have been at liberty to detach whole armies against him? or will it appear credible^o to posterity, that in a war carried on by the joint force of so many populous and powerful nations, *France* could send so great a part of its troops to one seat of the war, without suffering in any of the rest? Whereas it is well known, that if the Duke of *Savoy* had continued before *Toulon* eight days longer, he had been attacked by an army of sixty thousand men, which was more than double the number of his own; and yet the enemy was strong enough every where else to prevent the Confederates from making any impressiion upon them. However, let us fall into the right measures, and we may hope that the stroke is only deferred. The Duke of *Savoy* hath secured a passage into *Dauphiny*, and if the Allies make such efforts in all parts, as we may reasonably expect from them, that Prince may still make himself Master of the *French* dominions on the other side of the *Rhone*.

There is another part of our conduct which may perhaps deserve to be considered. As soon as we have agreed with the States General upon any augmentation of our forces, we immediately negotiate with some or other of the *German* Princes, who are in the same confederacy, to furnish out our quota in Mercenaries. This may be doubly prejudicial to the alliance; First, as it may have an ill influence on the resolutions of those Princes in the Diet of the Empire, who may be willing to settle as small a quota as they can for themselves, that they may have more troops to hire out; and in the next place, as it may hinder them from contributing the whole quota which they have settled. This actually happened in the last campaign, when we are told the *Germans* excused themselves for their want of troops upon the *Rhine*, as having already put most of their forces into the *British* and *Dutch* service. Such an excuse, indeed, is very unjust,

unjust, but it would be better to give them no occasion of making it; and on such occasions to consider what men are apt to do, as well as what they may do with reason.

It might therefore be for our advantage that all the foreign troops in the *British* pay should be raised in neutral countries. *Switzerland* in particular, if timely applied to, might be of great use to us; not only in respect of the reinforcements which we might draw from thence, but because such a draught of forces would lessen the number of those that might otherwise be employed in the *French* service. The bulk of our levies should nevertheless be raised in our own country, it being impossible for neutral States to furnish both the *British* and *Dutch* with a sufficient number of effective men; besides that the *British* soldiers will be more at the disposal of their General, and act with greater vigour under the conduct of one for whom they have so just a value, and whom they do not consider only as their leader, but as their country-man. We may likewise suppose that the soldiers of a neutral state, who are not animated by any national interest, cannot fight for pay with the same ardour and alacrity, as men that fight for their Prince and country, their wives and children.

It may likewise be worth while to consider whether the military Genius of the *English* nation may not fall by degrees, and become inferior to that of our neighbouring states, if it hath no occasion to exert it self. Minds that are altogether set on trade and profit, often contract a certain narrowness of temper, and at length become incapable of great and generous resolutions. Should the *French* ever make an unexpected descent upon us, we might want soldiers of our own growth to rise up in our defence; and might not have time to draw a sufficient number of troops to our relief from the remote corners of *Germany*. It is generally said, that if King *Charles II.* had made war upon *France* in the beginning of his reign, he might have conquered it by the many veterans which were scattered up and down this kingdom, and had been inured to service in the civil wars. It is to be hoped we shall never have such another nursery of soldiers; but if the present war gives a more military turn to all other nations of *Europe*, than to our own, it is to be feared we may lose in strength, what we gain in number. We may apply the same consideration nearer home. If all our levies are made in *Scotland* or *Ireland*, may not those two parts of the *British* monarchy, after the disbanding of the present army, be too powerful for the rest, in case of a revolt? though, God be thanked, we are not in any danger of one at present.

However, as these considerations do not concern the more essential part of our design, it is sufficient to have mentioned them.

The sparing of our selves in so important a conjuncture, when we have but this single opportunity left for the preserving every thing that is precious amongst us, is the worst sort of management that we can possibly fall into. The good husbandry of one age may intail an endless expence upon all posterity. We must venture the sacrificing a part of our lives and fortunes at present, if we will effectually secure both for the future. The *British* Kingdom is so well stock'd with people, and so much abounds in horse, that we have power enough in our own hands, did we make our utmost use of it, to humble *France*, and in a campaign or two to put an end to the war.

There is not a more disagreeable thought to the people of *Great Britain* than that of a standing army. But if a peace be made before the disunion of *France* and *Spain*, there are few, perhaps, that will not think the maintaining a settled body of numerous forces indispensable for the safety of our country. We have it therefore in our choice to raise such a strong reinforcement of troops as at present may be sufficient, in conjunction with those of the allies, for breaking the strength of the enemy; or when the peace is concluded, to keep on foot such an army as will be necessary for preventing his attempts upon us,

It is to be hoped that those who would be the most zealous against keeping up a constant body of regular troops after a general peace, will the most distinguish themselves for the promoting an augmentation of those which are now on foot; and by that means take care that we shall not stand in need of such an expedient.

We are indeed obliged by the present situation of our affairs to bring more troops into the field than we have yet done. As the *French* are retired within their lines, and have collected all their strength into a narrow compass, we must have greater numbers to charge them in their intrenchments, and force them to a battle. We saw the last campaign that an army of fourscore thousand of the best troops in *Europe*, with the Duke of *Marlborough* at the head of them, could do nothing against an enemy that were too numerous to be assaulted in their camps, or attacked in their strong holds.

There is another consideration which deserves our utmost attention. We know very well, that there is a Prince at the head of a powerful army, who may give a turn to the war, in which we are engaged, if he thinks fit to side with either party. I cannot presume to guess how far
our

our ministers may be informed of his designs: but unless they have very strong assurances of his falling in with the grand alliance, or not opposing it; they cannot be too circumspect and speedy in taking their precautions against any contrary resolution. We shall be unpardonable, if after such an expence of blood and treasure, we leave it in the power of any single Prince to command a peace, and make us accept what conditions he thinks fit. It is certain, according to the posture of our affairs in the last campaign, this Prince could have turn'd the ballance on either side; but it is to be hoped the liberties of *Europe* will not depend any more on the determination of one man's will. I do not speak this because I think there is any appearance of that Prince's uniting himself to *France*. On the contrary, as he hath an extraordinary zeal for the reformed religion, and great sentiments of honour, I think it is not improbable we should draw him over to the confederacy, if we press him to it by proper motives. His love for religion, and his sense of glory, will both have their effect on a Prince who hath already distinguished himself by being a patron of protestants, and guarantee of the *Westphalian* treaty. And if his interest hath any part in his actions, the Allies may make him greater offers than the *French* King can do in the present conjuncture. There are large extents of dominion in the forfeited principalities of the Empire; doubtful successions, to which the King of *Sweden* seems to have very just pretensions; and at the same time a great title not yet disposed of, and a feat of war on the *Moselle*, where none of our generals have signalized themselves. It would be presumption to be particular in any proposals on such an occasion; it is enough to have shewn in general, that there are fair opportunities, of which the wisdom of the confederates may make use.

Common sense will direct us, when we see so warlike a Prince at the head of so great an army hovering on the borders of our confederates, either to obtain his friendship, or secure our selves against the force of his arms. We are sure, whatever numbers of troops we raise, we shall have no hands but what will turn to account. Nay, we are certain, that extraordinary funds and augmentations for one or two campaigns may spare us the expence of many years, and put an end to taxes and levies for a whole age; whereas a long parsimonious war will drain us of more men and money, and in the end may prove ineffectual.

There is still a great popular objection, which will be made to every thing that can be urged on this subject. And indeed it is such a one as falls so much in with the prejudices and little passions of the multitude, that when it is turned and set off to advantage by ill-designing men, it

throws a damp on the publick spirit of the nation, and gives a check to all generous resolutions for its honour and safety. In short, we are to be told, that *England* contributes much more than any other of the Allies, and that therefore it is not reasonable she should make any addition to her present efforts. If this were true in fact, I do not see any tolerable colour for such a conclusion. Supposing among a multitude embarked in the same vessel, there are several that in the fury of a tempest will rather perish than work for their preservation; would it not be madness in the rest to stand idle, and rather chuse to sink together than do more than comes to their share? Since we are engaged in a work so absolutely necessary for our welfare, the remissness of our Allies should be an argument for us to redouble our endeavours rather than slacken them. If we must govern our selves by example, let us rather imitate the vigilance and activity of the common enemy, than the supineness and negligence of our friends.

We have indeed a much greater share in the war than any other part of the confederacy. The *French King* makes at us directly, keeps a King by him to set over us, and hath very lately augmented the salary of his court, to let us see how much he hath that design at his heart. Few of the nations in war with him, should they ever fall into his hands, would lose their religion or form of government, or interfere at present with him in matters of commerce. The *Dutch*, who are likely to be the greatest losers after the *Britains*, have but little trade to the *Levant* in comparison with ours, have no considerable plantations or commerce in the *West-Indies*, or any woollen-manufactures for *Spain*; not to mention the strong barrier they have already purchased between *France* and their own country.

But after all, every nation in the confederacy makes the same complaint, and fancies it self the greatest sufferer by the war. Indeed in so common a pressure, let the weight be never so equally distributed, every one will be most sensible of that part which lies on his own shoulders. We furnish, without dispute, more than any other branch of the alliance: but the question is, whether others do not exert themselves in proportion according to their respective strength. The Emperor, the King of *Prussia*, the Elector of *Hannover*, as well as the States of *Holland* and the Duke of *Savoy*, seem at least to come up to us. The greatest powers in *Germany* are borrowing money where they can get it, in order to maintain their stated Quota's, and go thorough their part of the expence: and if any of the Circles have been negligent,

negligent, they have paid for it much more in their late contributions, than what would have furnished out their shares in the common charges of the war.

There are others who will object the poverty of the nation, and the difficulties it would find in furnishing greater supplies to the war than it doth at present. To this we might answer, that if the nation were really as poor as this objection makes it, it should be an argument for enforcing rather than diminishing our present efforts against *France*. The sinking our taxes for a few years would be only a temporary relief, and in a little time occasion far greater impositions, than those which are now laid upon us. Whereas the seasonable expence of part of our riches, will not only preserve the rest; but by the right use of them procure vast additions to our present stock. It may be necessary for a person languishing under an ill habit of body to lose several ounces of blood, notwithstanding it will weaken him for a time, in order to put a new ferment into the remaining mass, and draw into it fresh supplies.

But we can by no means make this concession, to those who so industriously publish the nation's poverty. Our country is not only rich, but abounds in wealth much more than any other of the same extent in *Europe*. *France*, notwithstanding the goodness of its climate, the fertility of its soil, the multitude of its inhabitants, its convenient harbours, both for the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, and its present correspondence with the *West-Indies*, is not to compare with *Great Britain* in this particular. I shall transcribe word for word the passage of a late celebrated *French* Author, which will lay this matter in its full light; and leave the Reader to make the counter-part of the parallel between the two nations.

“ According to all the inquiries that I have been able to make during
“ several years, in which I have applied my self to this sort of remarks,
“ I have observed, that about a tenth part of the people of this kingdom
“ are reduced to beggary, and are actual beggars. That among the nine
“ other parts, five are not in a condition to give alms or relief to those
“ aforementioned, being very near reduced themselves to the same mis-
“ erable condition. Of the four other remaining parts, three are very
“ uneasy in their circumstances, and embarrassed with debts and law-
“ suits. In the tenth part, I reckon the Soldiers, Lawyers, Ecclesiasticks,
“ Merchants and substantial Citizens, which cannot make up more than a
“ hundred thousand families. And I believe I should not be mistaken, if
“ I should say, that there are not above ten thousand of these families,
“ who are very much at their ease: and if out of these ten thousand

“ we

“ we should take the men that are employed in publick busines, with
 “ their dependents and adherents, as also those whom the King supports
 “ by his bounty, with a few Merchants, the number of those who re-
 “ main will be surprisngly little. *Dixme Royale.*

What a dreadful account is this of nineteen millions of people; for so many the Author reckons in that kingdom. How can we see such a multitude of souls cast under so many subdivisions of misery, without reflecting on the absurdity of a form of government that sacrifices the ease and happiness of so many reasonable Beings to the glory of one of their fellow-creatures? But this is not our affair at present.

If we run over the other nations of *Europe* that have any part in the present war, we shall only pass through so many different scenes of poverty. *Spain, Portugal, and Savoy* are reduced to great extremities. *Germany* is exhausted to the last degree in many parts of it, and in others plundered of all she had left. *Holland* indeed flourishes above the rest in wealth and plenty: but if we consider the infinite industry and penuriousness of that people, the coarseness of their food and raiment, their little indulgences of pleasure and excess, it is no wonder that notwithstanding they furnish as great taxes as their neighbours, they make a better figure under them. In a commonwealth there are not so many overgrown estates as in monarchies, the wealth of the country is so equally distributed, that most of the community are at their ease, though few are placed in extraordinary points of splendor and magnificence. But notwithstanding these circumstances may very much contribute to the seeming prosperity of the *United Provinces*, we know they are indebted many millions more than their whole republick is worth, and if we consider the variety of taxes and impositions they groan under at a time when their private dissensions run high, and some of the wealthiest parts of the government refuse to bear their share in the publick expence, we shall not think the condition of that people so much to be envied as some amongst us would willingly represent it.

Nor is *Great Britain* only rich as she stands in comparison with other States, but is really so in her own intrinsic wealth. She had never more ships at sea, greater quantities of merchandise in her warehouses, larger receipts of customs, or more numerous commodities rising out of her manufactures than she has at present. In short, she sits in the midst of a mighty affluence of all the necessaries and conveniencies of life. If our silver and gold diminishes, our publick credit continues unimpaired, and if we are in want of bullion, it lies in our own power to supply our selves.

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The old *Roman* General, when he heard his army complain of thirst, shewed them the springs and rivers that lay behind the enemy's camp. It is our own case: the rout of a *Spanish* army would make us masters of the *Indies*.

If Prince *Eugene* takes upon him the command of the confederate forces in *Catalonia*, and meets with that support from the alliance which they are capable of giving him, we have a fair prospect of reducing *Spain* to the entire obedience of the house of *Austria*. The *Silesian* fund (to the immortal reputation of those generous patriots who were concerned in it) enabled that Prince to make a conquest of *Italy*, at a time when our affairs were more desperate there, than they are at present in the kingdom of *Spain*.

When our Parliament has done their utmost, another publick-spirited project of the same nature, which the common enemy could not foresee nor prepare against, might in all probability set King *Charles* upon the throne for which he hath so long contended. One pitched battle would determine the fate of the *Spanish* continent.

Let us therefore exert the united strength of our whole Island, and by that means put a new life and spirit into the confederates, who have their eyes fixed upon us, and will abate or increase their preparations according to the example that is set them. We see the necessity of an augmentation if we intend to bring the enemy to reason, or rescue our country from the miseries that may befall it; and we find our selves in a condition of making such an augmentation as, by the blessing of God, cannot but prove effectual. If we carry it on vigorously, we shall gain for our selves and our posterity a long, a glorious and a lasting peace; but if we neglect so fair an opportunity, we may be willing to employ all our hands, and all our treasures, when it will be too late; and shall be tormented with one of the most melancholy reflexions of an afflicted heart, That it was once in our power to have made our selves and our children happy.



T H E

