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# **The Works Of Horatio Walpole, Earl of Orford**

In Five Volumes

**Walpole, Horace**

**London, 1798**

A Counter Address to the Public, on the late Dismission of a General  
Officer

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**Nutzungsbedingungen**

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A  
COUNTER ADDRESS  
TO  
THE PUBLIC,  
ON  
THE LATE DISMISSION  
OF  
A GENERAL OFFICER.

Henri voit près des rois leurs infolens ministres :  
Il remarque sur tout ces conseillers finistres,  
Qui des moeurs & des loix avarés corrupteurs,  
De Themis & de Mars ont vendu les honneurs :  
Qui mirent les premiers à d'indignes encheres,  
L'incestimable prix des vertus de nos peres.

HENRIADE, Chant vii.

COUNTER ADDRESS

THE PUBLIC

THE LATE DISMISSION

A GENERAL OFFICER

THESE VERTUS SONT LES SEULES VERTUS  
IL EST NECESSAIRE DE LES AVOIR  
ET DE LES EXERCITER AVEC  
LE SENS DE LA JUSTICE ET DE LA  
BONNE FOI POUR LES FAIRE  
FRUITER A LA MANIERE D'UN  
GOUVERNEUR DE PEUPLE.

Par M. de Montesquieu

1751

A  
COUNTER ADDRESS  
TO  
THE PUBLIC.

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OFTEN as appeals on private grievances are laid before the public, it is seldom that they are brought to that tribunal with propriety. One of the cases in which they are least exceptionable, is, when the party appears as defendant. If public outrage be added to personal injustice, the impartial reader will receive with benignity, from the injured person, or his friends, a claim to their candour, if supported by argument, and offered with decency and temper. It might even be justifiable, with regard to the accuser, to retort railing with invective; but the latter method not only disgraces a good cause, but would imply a defect of capacity in the judges, as if their sentence were to be extorted by clamour.

In the case now to be laid before the public, there is no intention of arraigning either those who have oppressed, or those who have insulted. The former are too respectable, the latter too contemptible. Nothing is meant, but an attempt to prove that a man who has been deeply wounded, did not deserve punishment for his late conduct, nor could apprehend he had such ungenerous enemies as would add the grossest abuse to the full vengeance which power had given some men an opportunity of exercising.

The title of this address does not more clearly point out that general Conway is the subject of these sheets, than I fear the description does which I have just given. If the resignation and patience with which he has borne  
both

both disgrace by authority, and the most disingenuous calumny from hands I hope not authorised, had not convinced the author of this defence, that the general submitted himself to the opinion of his countrymen, from the conviction of his own blameless integrity, and was determined to take no steps to refute his calumniators; if after waiting to see whether himself, or any other more able of his friends, would take up his defence, I had not been confirmed in that idea, I should undoubtedly not have thought myself qualified to enter the lists in his behalf, nothing making me a competent apologist in such a controversy, but the clumsiness of the antagonists I am to encounter.

The two worthies whom I shall chiefly select to oppose in this contest, are the authors of a letter first printed in the *Gazetteer*, May 9, and of an Address to the Public on the late Dismission of a General Officer. If I pay them the compliment of distinguishing their productions from the rest of their accomplices, it is at least not from holding their abilities in higher estimation. No; it is to abridge my own trouble; as these, I was going to say gentlemen, have amassed the whole nosegay of nettles, which had been gathered in separate weeds by their voluminous comrades.

The first of them (the illiberal part of whose invective, as it has already been taken notice of, shall be passed over in silence) gives an intimation that general Conway had the vanity to vie with the illustrious Wolfe for military glory. I say *intimates* this—the whole scope of his argument tends to show that he meant general Conway. Nothing else could lead to such a suspicion. Let them heap what slanders they please on this virtuous man, yet they ought to make them some how or other coincide with some, however latent, ingredient in his character. But is boasting, is vain-glory, the smallest part of that character? Is he ostentatious, or a man of the most ingenuous modesty? When did he brag of his exploits? Where? Is his common behaviour assuming? Has he arrogated merit to himself? Has he fatigued ministers with solicitation for rewards? Has he complained of neglected services? Have his brother-officers heard him comparing himself to Wolfe? In parliament has he vaunted his military talents? or is it to this private confident, this *friendly* letter-writer, that he has unboomed his high opinion of his own merit? His life has been spent in public service: has his arrogance made him ridiculous to his superiors, or insupportable to the subalterns who have been under his command? His private friends have ever found his de-  
partment

portment humble, bashful, and condescending : it is strange that no man living but the letter-writer should have discovered his presumption.

The comparison of himself with that deservedly favourite hero of his country, general Wolfe, had Mr. Conway made it (which the letter-writer will give me leave to doubt, till he gives better proof of it than a malignant intimation), would have been in every light preposterous ; and therefore, as that author does not call Mr. Conway's understanding in question, was probably never thought of by him. Wolfe was a very young man, but a genius. He achieved his glorious career in one important action, for ever memorable, and reflecting consummate honour on his country, on himself, and on the great man whose councils he executed. General Conway has gone through a regular course in his profession for near seven-and-twenty years ; has been formed under those heroes the duke of Cumberland and prince Ferdinand ; has been engaged in six regular battles, besides many smaller actions ; and therefore whatever talents he has, or whatever military knowledge he has acquired (if either are allowed to him), have been improved and acquired by long and painful service. Though eminently distinguished for his gallant and indefatigable behaviour by those illustrious princes, he has never had the happiness of achieving any action of remarkable eclat, or of performing *alone* any act of signal utility to his country. The author of these sheets has seen his solicitude for employment in the field, his thirst of service, but never knew him prefer himself to the meanest officer in the army.

I shall here quit the letter-writer, and take no farther notice of his invectives, than as they coincide with those of his fellow-labourer, the author of the Address.

The latter good-natured person, apprehensive that the English language would not furnish him with sufficient terms of abuse, has had recourse to his Sallust for a sentence, whose bitterness should comprehend all the gall which he intended to spread through three-and-forty pages. Rome, when Sallust wrote, was arrived at the perfection of eloquent slander, and at the dregs of corruption. Such a writer, at such a period, could not fail to furnish a paragraph to justify the punishment of an *impious man*, who, void of conscience and honour, had stopped at nothing to glut his abominable ambition, and undo his country. The very case of general Conway. Is there an English-

man living, who understands Latin, and does not see how applicable the following words are to this high offender? *Equidem ego sic existumo omnes cruciatus minores quam facinora illorum esse; sed plerique mortales postrema meminere, et in hominibus impiis secleris eorum obliti, de pœnâ disserunt.* The impious men alluded to by the historian were the accomplices of Catiline, and were put to death. Those were the men in whose story the author of the address fished for a sentence that might suit the criminality of general Conway. I will not suppose that this author, who in his motto and in his book mentions with alacrity the word *punishment*, wishes that the parallel had been carried farther, because he knows that *as yet* our laws do not allow a man to be put to death for giving a *single* \* *vote* against the administration. I am persuaded his lenity is content with having a man ruined for such presumption; but he owns, p. 27, his ruin ought to be *total*. It had been no punishment, unless all he had, had been taken from him. He had been too impious, not to be beggared, as far as it was in the power of government.

Despotic acts, according to this writer, p. 26, give the idea of a tone of firmness and decision. Where he imbibed maxims so abhorrent from the genius of the English constitution, I do not pretend to guess. This is the first time we have seen it avowed *in print*, that total ruin was to be the portion of members of parliament who oppose administration. The galleys and the bowstring give an idea of firmness and decision in the expeditious governments of France and Turkey—but English ears are ill-accustomed to such sounds, nor at a general election would it secure a majority to the court, if ministerial candidates acknowledged such a code. Even in eastern climes, bashaws meet with terrible reverses. A free nation, fresh from conquering in every quarter of the globe, will not easily submit to domestic vizirs, who of all men living can claim least merit from our successes.

The exordium of the work itself is sarcastic on the people of England in general, to whom the author professes submitting his thoughts for their consideration, though in the very next paragraph he lets them know, that they assume *too great latitude to themselves in pronouncing their judgment willingly on all matters indiscriminately*. He tells them they take this freedom of judgment for liberty, whereas it is *a cloak for maliciousness, and an intemperance, which*

\* It was not strictly speaking by a single vote, differed with the administration. The term but on a single subject, that general Conway *single vote* is used to avoid circumlocution.

ought

*ought deservedly to be reckoned a reproach to a civilized people.* The apostrophe is extraordinary, not over obliging to his readers, and surely little decent to a people *yet free*: For what is the context? A general officer is dismissed for his behaviour in parliament, in a free parliament (so this daring author declares; we shall, perhaps, hear what the parliament next winter thinks of his assertion)—the people of England discuss this subject—Licentious, audacious, uncivilized Englishmen! are you competent judges of such a case? Let me tell you, in France, a civilized country, a man would be sent to the Bastille, who should presume to agitate such a question.

Yet farther: *Attempts, he says, have been made to render it the object of public clamour, and insinuations have been thrown out that this was only the beginning of sorrows; that such an unconstitutional act was not meant to stand single, but was to be followed by the disgrace of several other general officers; and lest this should be borne too calmly, it was industriously added, that the whole army was to be new modelled.* By whom these attempts and insinuations have been made, I do not know: this author, I suppose, does, though a little apt to assert rashly. Surely not by the general himself. The calm and decent resignation with which he received the notification of his majesty's pleasure, the submission with which he acknowledged the receipt of it, his retirement in the country ever since, except for a few days, when he came to pay his duty to the king, and his forbearance of the least murmur since, this behaviour will clearly disculpate him from being party to the author's rhapsody. The rest of this uncivilized nation, I fear, has not been so silent, though I believe no man living has said *all* this author charges on many. Who has said, this was the *beginning* of sorrows? The proscriptions of last year, the dismissal of general Accourt, &c. must have been strangely forgotten, if general Conway's disgrace could be thought a *beginning*. That it has been reported, that a noble lord carried into the closet a list of sixteen officers whose removal he advised, is certainly true—I mean such a report; and their not being dismissed, is no proof it was never proposed. This author, perhaps, may think that to have spared them, gives *no idea of a tone of firmness and decision*. His notions of government are pretty high and despotic; he may censure too the time chosen for dismissing general Conway, as weak and pusillanimous, not being done in the face of parliament, but respited till a session was at the distance of many months. I, who think the present administration fully decisive enough for the *present* constitution, applaud their temperance and their lenity. Their magnanimity I will wait for other occasions of extolling.



But he adds, It has been industriously reported that the army *was going to be new modelled*—I had rather wave this point—it is too serious, and too delicate. Such reports I hope are false; from my soul I do. I had rather stigmatise the authors of such whispers in the gross, than enter into the discussion. No, there can be no such intention—For what should it be calculated? What could be proposed to be done with the army when so modelled? The present army has conquered in every quarter of the globe—against whom could it be wished to be employed, that it would not encounter with the same alacrity and valour that it exerted in the last war? Is there an officer in the army whose loyalty to his majesty and ardour in the cause of his country have not been tried and approved? What enemies can the king or Great Britain have, whom the present army would not shed their blood to combat? What dark designs are there in agitation, which should make it desirable to remove the present officers, and place others in their room who would be more compliant, and of course detestable to their countrymen? There are no such designs, consequently there can be no such plan. The nation is united to a man, Jacobitism is extinguished, Jacobites pardoned and received into favour; from what quarter could apprehensions arise to the government? *Only two* general officers have been dismissed, and, as the author asserts, for parliamentary disobedience: no commissions have been given to men of problematic principles. I agree therefore with this author, that it is highly blameable to insinuate that there is any intention of new modelling the army.

One word he has dropped in the paragraph I have been quoting, which must not pass unnoticed. The dismissal of general Conway, he says, is not *unprecedented*; and he alludes probably to the case of lord Cobham, the duke of Bolton, and lord Westmorland in the late reign. That those officers were broken, is certainly true; but with a wide and material difference from the case of general Conway. They were engaged in the most offensive and declared opposition against the court. Whoever recollects that time, knows to what an intemperance of language and behaviour their opposition was carried. How the measure of removing them was received by great part of the nation is well known; it was discussed in parliament, and followed by that memorable protest signed by several great lords now living. Whether the step of breaking those officers was wise or constitutional, is another question; but it certainly bore no resemblance to the case of Mr. Conway, who, as I shall prove presently, was by no means in opposition, is of all men living the least factious, and so far from having been guilty of any indecent language before

his disgrace, that even since it happened, he has not expressed himself with acrimony, or varied from that uniform decorum which has graced every period of his fortune. Unprecedented the case then stands with regard to him; and that a new precedent would not take its date in his person, and in this reign, was reasonably to be expected, by the recent restitution of sir Henry Erskine, accompanied with a retrospective disapprobation of cashiering officers for their conduct in parliament.

As I am unwilling to swell this address to too great a length, and to engage in matter foreign to my purpose, I gladly pass by two or three senseless and declamatory passages in the author I am examining, whose injudicious warmth betrays the fore places of his patrons, with as little skill in finding remedies. The club at Wildman's every body knows is a terrible grievance, and this quack cannot help tattling what he hears; foolishly enough, God knows, on this occasion, as general Conway belongs not to that meeting, nor ever dined at that tavern; though this author insinuates it (for what does a falsehood cost a man who writes for pay?) by saying, *You see there are some general officers among them.* His grace's favourite nephew (who that is I don't know), the instances of the king of Prussia and Contades, and such rubbish, nothing at all to the purpose, I likewise pass over, and shall not meet this author again till page 7, where affecting solid reasoning after empty flourishes, he desires us *to set aside from the question every personal consideration.* What his own practice will be, we shall see presently; and as we shall find that practice to be directly the reverse of what he demands from others; as he, instead of omitting, drags into the question every personal consideration which he can invent to asperse general Conway, it is evident that *all* he begs in the passage above, is, that we would forget the general's virtues and services. If we agree to that one candid postulatum, if we will promise not to think that virtue and services should have had some weight in softening the general's fate, he hopes by some arguments, or what he would have pass for arguments, and by more contradictions, with the super-addition of abuse, to convince us that there never was an act of a more harmless nature to all the world, nay even to the general himself (*vide* p. 23.), than taking away the profession of an officer who has served for twenty-six years, has been in six battles, and who came home recommended to favour by prince Ferdinand, for the single offence of having voted on a constitutional point against the administration. With all the obstacles he overleaps, and with all the foreign helps he calls in to his assistance, the task

our author has laid on himself still seems to be difficult; difficult with regard to the public, to the army, and to the parliament, hitherto not accustomed to be told, contrary to their petition to his majesty at the beginning of every new meeting, not to have offences committed in parliament questioned out of it, that such offences are punished by the crown. In the cases I have mentioned of the duke of Bolton, &c. the then minister certainly never presumed, never dared to acknowledge that they were removed for parliamentary conduct. Every body knows how that age would have flamed at such an avowal.

My author begins with telling us, p. 7. that "our concern for the general, as a man, would be more properly expressed for the conduct occasioning this dismission." The outset is unlucky, and promises ill for what is to follow. The voice of the nation went along with the conduct of Mr. Conway. They were, and are still of opinion, that general warrants are radically and alarmingly dangerous to liberty. They love the man who was ready to sacrifice to the liberties of his country those emoluments which he had obtained by defending it against its domestic and foreign enemies. They regard him as a martyr to their freedom, and to his own conscience: and let me tell this author, that they will detest a scribbler who defends, recommends, punishment for integrity. His next step is to reduce his argumentation to method, which he ranges under three heads:

"1. What hurt has been done to the army in general by the late dismission?"

"2. What particular hardship has fallen on the individual who is the object of it?"

"3. What detriment has the public received from a measure, represented as so highly injurious to it?"

The questions are of moment: the author takes the negative on all, and defends each as ably as I believe each can be defended. If I succeed in confuting him on every one, it will certainly not be from superior abilities, but from the impossibility of defending tenets so absurd. A genius, from Rousseau down to this writer, loves a paradox; but even such a genius as Rousseau is apt to miscarry in the attempt.

Dismissions

Dismissions in general, he says, are sanctified by custom, though state physicians have considered them as a kind of extraordinary remedy, not to be had recourse to in the usual stages of a disorder, but only to be prescribed when every other treatment has been found ineffectual. This description of dismissions he must mean, if he means any thing, to apply to the case of general Conway. What was that? Why, on a question in parliament, certainly of a constitutional, and of the highest nature, on which the opinions of all men were so nearly balanced, that 232 were on one side, and 218 on the other, general Conway agreed with the lesser number. This was the *disorder* which, from this author's words, we are to suppose the ministers thought so dangerous an one, that they tried every treatment to cure it. Indeed!—What are the nostrums which ministers *can* apply to parliamentary opposition? I know none, but bribes and threats. Did ministers really prescribe these emollients and caustics on a constitutional vote in parliament? And do we live to hear this avowed? Away with magna charta, the bill of rights, and the revolution, if men dare utter this language in the face of day. The boldest state empyrics in the days of any Charles or James would not have ventured to profess such doctrines. But if we have such leeches, the patient, it seems, scorned both their drugs and their blisters; he has proved his constitution sound, and would not be doctored out of his honour and his virtue.

The next words of this defendant of the political faculty are not less amazing: "One singular property," says he, p. 9. "attending this regimen is, that as it is very *violent* (indeed it is) in its operation, and consequently often annihilates the patient, (with what glee this butcher talks of violence!) yet it is often found to act collaterally, and produces the most surprising effects on persons in the same disorder." Am I awake? Do I read right what is before me? Have members of parliament ever suffered themselves to be treated in this contemptuous and profligate style? Is the parliament of Great Britain so corrupt, so lost to shame, that it deserves to be told that its votes are to be intimidated in this manner? that the representatives of the people tremble when one of their body loses his employment, and become obsequious, compliant, slavish? Or is it to officers alone that this insult is offered? Are the fifteen other gentlemen, said to have been in the black list, of that very timid complexion, that they can hear this language with patience, and without indignation? Can any other officer in parliament endure to have it sup-  
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posed that he gives a vote from fear or lucre? That he does mean the officers in general, who have seats in parliament, I am inclined to believe, as in the next paragraph he directly applies it to them: and he begins to soften his tone, by allowing that length of time and confessed ability in the profession should not be lightly set aside: not, says he, but the best pretensions may be cancelled by a sequel of conduct which no situation can justify, no exertions of military prowess can atone for. Yet lest even this palliative should reach that indecent perseverer in opposition, Mr. Conway, he takes care to insinuate, that the general owed his rise solely to parliamentary connexions. He had allowed a little to length of time; but, as contradictions cost him nothing, that concession is soon forgotten, and the general's every promotion resolved into parliamentary interest. Twenty-six years of very sharp service in two wars and a rebellion, go for nothing: the approbation of such commanders as the duke of Cumberland and prince Ferdinand for as little—yet to this spiteful, invidious insinuation we will oppose nothing but the testimonial of every officer in the army. If there is a single one who will say that general Conway has been promoted beyond his desert, we will allow this author all the weight that his ill-nature can demand. Had Wolfe himself lived, and acted as uprightly, as there is no doubt but he would have acted, it is not unfair to suppose that he would have received as little quarter from this martial legislator, who, though he would stigmatise general Conway with the imputation of owing his promotion to parliament, holds, in so many words, that time-serving in parliament ought to be the great rule of judging of an officer's merit. Do I mis-state his arguments? If I do not, what a heap of contradictions!

His next positions are so absurd, that I shall only quote them, not deign to give them an answer. They are, that civil employments are acquired by greater industry, are more difficult to be obtained than military; and that if the progress in the former be more rapid, they are the sure marks of uncommon genius and proficiency, seldom bestowed, and not to be acquired nor maintained without a great degree of merit. We beg our readers to take the little red book, and examine the list of those at the head of the army and of the state, by our author's rule.

He is fond of this hypothesis, and, in consequence of it, tells a long story about I really do not know whom, in the course of which he works himself  
up

up into such a fit of tenderness, that he almost weeps over a poor gentleman who broke his heart on being turned out of his employment. I am heartily sorry for it, and hope, among the numerous proscriptions of last year, which raged even against old domestics whose faithful services had been rewarded with little offices, that not one of them was reduced to a like tragic extremity.

This moving tale, which, if applicable to the present question, turns against the author's argument, because the man did not die for being turned out of a *civil* employment, but because he was turned out of his employment at all; for a man who wants bread, wants it equally whatever his profession *has been*— This silly story, I say, is followed by two or three pages of reasoning equally absurd, in which the author would prove, that if it is held right not to dismiss an officer for a conscientious vote in parliament, it would follow that the army would become perpetual, and the officers would think themselves hardly used if their regiments were to be broken by act of parliament. What sort of understandings this writer thinks are the understandings of military men, I cannot tell; but here is the reasoning he puts into their mouths. *If we do our duty in parliament, we shall of course be of opinion that we ought to resist the parliament, should its acts interfere with our interest, for being conscientious necessarily makes men unconscientious.* Was it really worth while to waste four pages in stating nonsense, which you see can be stated in four lines? Yet on this flimsy foundation the author erects the solution of his first question, that the army is not injured by the late dismissal: whereas, if there was the least shadow of argument in his position, it would, according to custom, make against himself. For instance, if officers were not to be punished for their conduct in parliament, and from not being punished would find their commissions perpetual, would not the consequence be, that they are hurt by being punished? In fact, his argument is good no where; and if it could be good any where, it would not be where he has placed it. It could only have the appearance of an argument under his \* third head, not under the first, and there I would have given it an answer, to which here it has not the shadow of a title; for, when a foolish man answers himself, he receives the only reply he deserves.

\* Because it might be pretended, that it would not hurt the public to have the officers undecieved in the opinion that the army ought to be perpetual.

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Yet, while he flounders from absurdity to contradiction, he drops some sentences that must not pass unnoticed. *The army, says he, cannot but think that the general should have given his assistance to government if he expected their support.* Very decent words when they come to be analysed. Is it avowed that the discussion of the legality of a secretary of state's warrant was a measure which government wanted to carry? I thought it was a mere parliamentary enquiry how the law stood. If not, it was an aim at extension of the prerogative, a point on which parliament always has been and ought to be exceedingly jealous. The general, says our writer, ought to have given his assistance to these views. In what capacity? If as a member of parliament, his duty, as such, forbade it. But he ought, if he expected support from administration. Indeed?—Are those the bargains which government makes with officers? Does it say (I ask for information), Vote for the extension of prerogative, and you shall have a regiment—or—to come nearer to the point—if you do not, you shall lose your regiment? If this is the language of government, we have reason not only to dread the perpetuity of the army, but to fear its existence for an hour. Why is it kept up? Because we apprehend becoming a province to France—I have no longer any such dread, if government holds the language which this author imputes to it. It is indifferent to me whether I am a French slave or an English one—perhaps there is less disgrace in becoming the former. It is less ignominious to be chained by a brave enemy, than by base usurping countrymen, and their treacherous tools. I affirm, an officer who should act in consequence of such a compact as this author would establish, would be a traitor—and for those who would employ him—they would want a name. Yet hear *how* he goes on. *They, the officers, will soon bring themselves to be of opinion, that as he went out of his way and of his profession, to perplex and harass the servants whom the king thought proper to employ, it is no wonder that, in some sort, retaliation should take place.* It is difficult to say whether my astonishment at that man's boldness, or my contempt for his folly, is the greater. Turn over all the fawning sermons of the court-chaplains in the reign of the first James and Charles; and all the prerogative tracts written to flatter the second Charles and James, and cull any passage that surpasses the assumptions in this. What! Does a member of parliament *go out of his way*, who opposes the power of a secretary of state? Are the officers of the crown superior to parliament? Or is not parliament to check and controul them, nay, to watch over them, even when exerting the most legal powers? Is not this man's doctrine a subversion of the  
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the whole constitution? Does a member of parliament go out of his way who calls the highest officer of the crown to account? Parliament is the supreme court of this kingdom; nor has it been heard since the Revolution, that the meanest member in the house of commons is not authorized to question any minister, be he whom he will. How the general *went out of his profession*, I do not so clearly see. He and every officer sits in parliament as representative of some county or borough. To act in parliament as an officer, might not be going out of his profession, but would undoubtedly be going into it in a style for which he would deserve to be hanged; the constitution not being just upon the same foot it was when Cromwell appointed his major-generals.

I take up this audacious sentence, because I perceive there are daily sycophants who attack the constitution with repeated insults. Such was that scandalous book, called *Droit-le Roy*. The parliament deservedly stigmatized it. Even the ministers declared they would have complained of it, had it come to their knowledge. It is very strange, that men should act the part these profligate scribblers act! They expose themselves to the indignation of their countrymen, by writing in defence of prerogative and tyranny, submit to the shame of appearing to pay court to ministers by the worst kind of flattery, and yet take infinite care not to let that adulation reach the ears of those for whom alone it can be designed. I have heard that virtue is its own reward, but this is the first time that ever infamy appeared to be so. Should these sheets be fortunate enough to reach the eye of any minister, I trust it will not be from the Opposition that we shall hear next winter of the Address to the public being complained of in parliament, as attacking the dearest privileges of that august assembly.

The flatterer in question soon relieves our indignation with a jocular conclusion of his insolent paragraph. *The general*, says he, *went out of his way to harass and perplex the king's servants*. Poor gentlemen! I heartily grieve for them. Be they whom they will, that are so easily harassed and perplexed; as his majesty *thought proper to employ them*, they ought not to be teased and vexed and bewildered. However new and droll the complaint is, it ought to have some weight. When our ministers are so liable to be put out of their way, it is barbarous to molest them; and the only specious reason which the author has given in his whole book for the dismissal of general Conway, is this—*Retaliation in some sort should take place*. A general officer ought to be



broken for perplexing and harassing the king's poor ministers. There have been ministers, indeed, who would not have thought that turning a troublesome speaker out of his employment, would be the wisest method to prevent being harassed by him—But these poor gentlemen were perplexed too, and therefore no wonder they did not act wisely. *They were charged*, says he, *with ignorance and inability*. Here again a great minister would have confuted his opponent with proofs of knowledge and talents. Revenging one's self on a man's profession, is rather confessing the charge.

I have stated the author's premises ; now let us see how he draws his conclusion. *The army will not THEN think themselves aggrieved in this particular dismission. The cause in which this general was engaged, related no way to the defence of their profession* : they will not therefore lament him as one "fallen in their behalf. And with respect to the situation of military men in general, whenever they incur the displeasure of their master in matters wholly foreign to the military, they will be so far from making a cause commune, or from applying to themselves as any mark of disgrace, that it will prove rather a means of keeping them more closely attached to the respective businesses before them, as the surest means of preserving a connection between their merits and their advancement."

This is the logic of our court-advocate ; and since the beginning of time, I believe no court-cause was ever worse defended. Whatever the ministers are, the officers, I am sure, must be men of very perplexed and perplexable understandings, if they can for a moment be the dupes of such puerilities. For what is his argument ? Officers cannot think themselves aggrieved, if one of their corps loses his employment for something not relating to his profession. Now the very reverse of this is true, and is an answer to his whole first division. They do think themselves aggrieved, because general Conway was dismissed for nothing relating to his profession. They do think it hard that the rewards of years, of blood, of bravery, spent and exerted in the service of their king and country, should be of so precarious a tenure, that they are to be sacrificed to the vengeance of fretful and perplexed ministers—Nay, that the rewards of honour are incompatible with the dictates of conscience : that the merit of ten campaigns can be obliterated by one session : that to serve their king and country is not enough ; they must serve ministers also : that the only security of honours, is the forfeiture of honour ; and that they  
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are to be told at last, after encountering all the hardships and dangers of their profession, *that the surest means of preserving a connection between their merits and their advancement*, is to tremble when a brother-officer is cashiered for his virtue, and to abandon him:—in other words, that a coward may rise to the highest posts in the army, and that a slave is sure of doing so.

I shall be much more brief on the two following sections. The defence of general Conway's character was the principal view of this tract; but that can be established beyond contradiction, in few words. Yet even the excellence of his character would not be sufficient to demonstrate the injustice he has suffered, unless I had shown too, as I have I think unanswerably, that it is unjust and unconstitutional to take away the profession of an officer for his behaviour in parliament. In the course of that argument, I have had occasion to expose the alarming doctrines that are daily propagated, repugnant to this constitution, destructive of the unquestionable rights of parliament, dangerous to liberty in general (without which every thing we enjoy is contemptible), subversive of the whole system of the Revolution, and threatening destruction to the illustrious house of Hanover, whose succession to the crown was founded on that revolution. No man therefore but a Jacobite can wish to see an extension of the prerogative, as every extension of it under a new family would be so far a justification of king James's measures. The defence of liberty, and of the present royal family, against dark and insidious traitors, was a cause well worth expending a few pages upon.—I pass to our author's second division.

His question is, What particular hardship has fallen on the individual who is the subject of the late dismissal? A position too ludicrous to deserve a serious answer, and yet as capable of being maintained as either of his other sections. In the schools we know ridiculous tenets are often given out for argumentation; but this is the first time that such a question was ever agitated in a political controversy. As I have no leisure to waste on such boyish impertinences, which carry nonsense in their face and contradiction in their mouth, let it suffice to repeat his arguments. The first is, that the general having a large independent income, which income by the way is his wife's jointure, consequently precarious, cannot be accounted a great sufferer by losing the greatest part of the income. The second, that he has enjoyed such large appointments, that, if he had never spent a farthing of them, he would

be very rich — But I trifle with my readers, and should be as inexcusable as the author I quote, to fatigue them by the repetition of such absurdities, to which, in truth, the author trusts so little, that he soon quits them for the more favourite topics of defamation. On this head he is so candid, first, as to beg we will believe nothing we hear in the general's favour; secondly, that we will listen to every thing he can say to his prejudice: when both these concessions are obtained, he hopes to prove, that the general is no sufferer. Any commendation of the general he pronounces *suspicious information*, p. 24. Detraction in the mouth of a professed adversary is to pass for unquestionable; though he will give me leave to surmise, that if the dismissal of Mr. Conway could have been defended by reasons, so much recourse would not have been had to defamation: and yet I am of opinion, that it is easier to justify the removal of him than to fully his character.

The first reflection we find is an indirect attack upon his political behaviour; though, while the author makes it, he tacitly gives up the whole scope of his preceding argument. *I do know*, says he, p. 25, *that altogether he has received much public money, and I have no room to doubt (as the greater part of it was given under his grace's administration) that an equal service was performed.* Now, if there is any meaning in this paragraph (a supposition I only hazard, and may wrong the author by imputing any meaning at all to him), it implies that the duke of N. paid Mr. Conway for his behaviour in parliament — And is this at last become an imputation? I thought it was not only the most sure, but the most right means for officers *to preserve a connection between their merits and advancement.* Was the same conduct wrong in the duke of N. that is right in *perplexed* ministers? That the author did mean this, is probable from the very next paragraph, in which he mentions the general's late conduct in parliament. But though he contradicts himself to get at an argument, he has not got at truth. General Conway's preferments came in the regular course, were generally conferred after particular services; as his first regiment, which he obtained after the battle of Culloden, by the recommendation of his royal highness the duke of Cumberland; and in none of them had the duke of Newcastle more share than in common with the rest of the late king's servants.

Having now, as he thinks, cleared his way, and removed all objections of hardship on the general, both as an officer and an individual, the author's  
next

next sally is an attempt to state the dismissal as almost the object of the general's choice. As if nothing was more common than to take away military commissions for parliamentary behaviour, and as if that practice had not been peculiarly stigmatised on the restoration of sir Henry Erskine, the author affirms that Mr. Conway could not but foresee the consequence of the part *he chose* to take in public business: a part which in the next sentence this writer terms *braving his royal master in his bedchamber*. This language is so much that of a half-converted Jacobite, that it is impossible not to be struck with it. How little is this man acquainted with the virtues of that royal person whose name he rashly introduces into a libel! Has this man forgotten, or did he never hear of, that gracious declaration which characterised the very dawn of the present reign, that elections should be free, and not a shilling should be spent in obtaining a partial representative? Is it likely that a virtuous prince, who trusted the uprightness of his measures to the free voice of his people, would imbibe partial resentments against conscientious members? Let this author take what liberty he pleases with ministers, and ascribe the late dismissal to their vengeance, but let him beware of confounding their squabbles with the person of the sovereign, who is the just and equal father of all his subjects, and who does not entertain prejudices against virtuous men for obeying the dictates of their conscience. His majesty may have been advised to remove general Conway, and has taken that advice; but he does not thereby become a party in a ministerial quarrel, nor look upon himself as insulted because his ministers have been *perplexed*. All acts in this country are considered by the law as the acts of those who advise the crown, and as such only I speak of them. The veneration I have for the excellent prince with whom we are blessed, would not permit me to name him, but to reprimand this scribbler; nor would general Conway hold any man as his friend, who should pronounce that royal name but with duty, respect, and affection. He would lay down his life for that amiable sovereign; nor has there been, I believe, one moment since his dismissal in which he has not felt the same ardour of love and zeal, which warmed him in those happier hours when he had the honour of standing nearer to his royal master. Let this suffice as a reply to two or three pages of rancour and indecency. One word, however, must be taken up: the author says, he does not remember in the several stages of Mr. Wilkes's affair, on which the greater part of the time before the Christmas holidays was spent, that the general took any part in resenting the insult which had been so grossly offered to his master. I might ask him, whether he remembers that  
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every groom of the bedchamber spoke upon that occasion; and if not one of them did, as I believe they did not, why silence was more criminal in him than in the rest? Had he defended that insult, he might indeed have been said to have braved his master. The fact is, every man in the house condemned that insult in his heart; but it was impossible every man in the house should express his abhorrence. But hear a little further:—General Conway, as is well known, was often up to speak, but was never pointed to. It is much less known, but not less true, that his intention was to declare his detestation of the insult, and to separate it entirely, as it was in its nature separated, from the power claimed by the secretaries of state. After Christmas, in the very speech represented as so offensive, Mr. Conway did make that distinction: but the author chose a silent period preferably to one of activity, because silence could be misinterpreted, but actual words could not be tortured to mean the very contrary of what they expressed. Thus we see this author's malice is as unlucky when built on the general's silence, as it has been when catching at what he really acted.

If the libellist has been unfortunate hitherto, both in his facts and insinuations, he will not redeem his credit by the subsequent pages.

One of the principal complaints made on this dismission has been, that it was for a single vote. As the author admires *a tone of firmness and decision*, one might have expected that he would have applauded the administration for the promptness of authority exercised on a man who had offended but by one vote. How, on the contrary, he comes to be sensible that such summary proceedings are not quite consonant to the spirit of our constitution, I do not know: but so it is, that he endeavours to show that Mr. Conway was not dismissed for a single vote. He does not, indeed, succeed in that attempt; yet I allow that, by the very endeavour, he is candid enough to own that the measure of cashiering an officer for one vote is not to be defended: *Si Pergama dextrâ defendi possent, etiam hæc defensa fuissent.*

I will sum up his account of Mr. Conway's parliamentary behaviour, and then we shall judge whether our author has made out that the general was actually engaged in a system of opposition.

Before Christmas general Conway said nothing.

Between

Between January 16 and February 17 he never happened to be of the same opinion with the king's servants, except on some one point in which Mr. Wilkes was concerned; the particulars of which our candid author chooses to forget. I shall help his recollection presently.

It was not administration alone that considered him as their opponent; the opposition were daily vaunting of him as an important acquisition, and indeed gave out, at one time, that he had undertaken to lead them.

What doubt could be entertained of his inclinations, after the virulent charge of ignorance and incapacity which he poured forth against the minister\*?

Whenever, therefore, the dismissal is mentioned, together with the conduct in parliament, let the public be assured that the general was vigorous and active; and, in short, totally in opposition.

Thus stand the proofs. Now hear the answer.

Not only from Jan. 16 to Feb. 17, but from Nov. 15, the day the parliament met, to April 19, when it rose, general Conway was not once of a different opinion from the king's servants, but on the single affair of the warrants: and I do not take advantage of many questions on which there was no division; but when there was, he voted with them, as on the cyder-tax, the second great point of opposition; and assisted the ministry on the bill for regulating franks. Is that assertion, therefore, of our author proved a falsehood?

The case he chooses to forget is no less remarkable, and the very mention

\* The author, who in his first state of this charge had used the expression *the king's servants*, here names *the minister*. Who *the minister* is, I really don't know; nor whom the author means is it my business to enquire. As every thing *personal* is carefully avoided throughout this whole treatise, I shall not take up the term *the minister*, but continue to argue, as I have done, in generals. I desire, too, to have it ob-

served, that I have not introduced a single argument foreign to the subject of dismissals, and to the warrants which occasioned the late dismissal; not choosing to imitate the conduct of the author I answer, who has dealt indiscriminate abuse on variety of persons no way connected with the general in question, and whose names, in this place, serve no purpose but that of calumny.

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of it will show why he chose to forget it. It was the affair of Alexander Dun, in which general Conway was peculiarly active, and assistant to the ministry, and by which he demonstrated that his behaviour on the warrants was simply conscientious, and that he was no partizan of Mr. Wilkes.

He had declared to a minister, before witnesses, in the most express terms, that he was not, nor intended to be, engaged in opposition. He had declared the same to several chiefs in the opposition. Which, therefore, is to be believed, the general or the author? For that mob appendix, of its being given out, that the general had undertaken to lead the opposition, I question whether even the garreteers of the minority went so far as to make such an assertion to any compeer in the majority.

We have seen what was the general's conduct, and what were his declarations. As they were repugnant to the author's assertions, his last resource was to guess at the general's inclinations.—Was he then at last dismissed for a guess—and that a wrong one? Leave out the word *virulent*, which is *gratis dictum*, to make something of nothing, and I believe there never was a set of ministers, who, not only by Mr. Conway, but by the whole opposition, were ever so gently treated as the present have been. Would not one think, by the manner in which this author has stated the charge, that general Conway had accused the ministers of ignorance in the revenue, of inability in making the late peace, in short, of being the most incapable administration that ever disgraced government! But reduce the charge to plain truth, and all it amounted to was, accusing the ministers of not knowing the precise extent of power for granting warrants vested by law in the secretary of state.

With what truth, with what justice, therefore, does this frontless man take upon him to assure the public, that general Conway was totally in opposition? Had it not been wiser to defend the measure of turning him out of the army for a single vote? The author has no more success in falsifying *for* his masters, than *against* those they persecute.

Dissatisfied with his own endeavours, and still suspecting that the dismission for parliamentary conscientious conduct would shock the nation, the author flies to abuse, and plunges to the bottom of that mud in quest of something that may abate national pity for an oppressed and worthy man. I rejoice,  
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and have ever rejoiced, at these shifts of a despotic party. When collateral reasons are called in, one is sure the true reason is not tenable.

But where shall defamation be fastened? How asperse one of the most spotless characters that this or any country has produced? It must be done with a nice hand, and with uncommon address. His virtues as a man, a husband, a father, a subject, a senator, are unquestionable. His disinterestedness is conspicuous, his modesty most amiable, his attention to his profession laborious, his courage unquestionable.—It is true, and yet there we will attack him. In order, too, to appear candid, we will begin with allowing what we cannot deny. When we are so candid as to confess his bravery, we shall be the more easily believed when we insinuate that he is a coward. We will drop the word Rochfort; and that single little word, like a spell, will hint to all the world, that if general Conway had been the hero he is supposed, Rochfort would have been taken: and when that is believed, will not the ministers be justified in breaking a man in the year 1764, who might have taken Rochfort in the year 1757?

This may be artful, and much good may such art do any man that possesses it! It will lead him into as many scrapes as this author has involved himself in.

This interpretation must strike every man as the evident intention of recalling the idea of Rochfort. Yet, as the author allows, and no man living questions, *the spirited courage of the general*, and as I would not load even this libellist with more odium than he deserves, let us see if the revival of the affair of Rochfort will admit of a less malevolent explanation.—Perhaps the author, conscious that no direct imputation would stick, yet officious to raise unfavourable sentiments of the general in the minds of his readers, no matter on what foundation, might mean to call in question Mr. Conway's judgment. An officer who has been taken prisoner after charging three times in the village of Fontenoy; keeping his regiment to the last in the field, in order to cover the retreat; and whose whole conduct has been a series of intrepidity, cannot be written out of his reputation as a soldier—No, that will never do.—We must try whether his capacity is not less proof against misrepresentation. Whatever was the author's meaning, the inference, as I have said, is, that general Conway deserved to be cashiered for not having taken Rochfort



in 1757. But general Mordaunt commanded that expedition, not general Conway. Does an inferior in command deserve to be punished for that miscarriage, when the principal did not, but was honourably acquitted? General Conway was urgent in advising some attempt. Did that make him more criminal than his superior? General Mordaunt votes with the administration; general Conway voted, on one question, against it—Perhaps this may have made some difference in the degree of their criminality.

Thus far I have argued upon the foot of some blame; but I have other difficulties to propose to the objector. The plan of surprising Rochfort was one of the vigorous measures of that great minister, Mr. Pitt. The patrons of our author always called that scheme one of Mr. Pitt's visions. Mr. Conway could not in any degree be to blame that Rochfort was not taken, unless the attempt was practicable. I beg this author to choose which he will censure, Mr. Pitt or the generals concerned. It will be difficult for him to revile both the one and the other. If, to serve a present emergency, he admits the practicability, he will be so good as to show that it was practicable; a fact that I have never yet heard ascertained: and when he has done this, Mr. Conway will remain blameless, who was innocent of the miscarriage, and who never acquiesced in abandoning the project till it was too late to undertake it. And, upon this occasion, I will tell the author an anecdote, and from very good authority. When the affair of Rochfort was public talk, the earl of C—— told the following story:—Mr. Conway, said his lordship, I am sure is brave; I know it from the best hands. I was commending George Stanhope (his lieutenant-colonel) for what I heard of his behaviour in Germany. 'Faith, my lord, replied that gallant young man, I believe I do not want spirit more than other folks. Indeed, I do not pretend to the intrepidity of Harry Conway, who walks up to the mouth of a cannon with as much indifference as if he was going to dance a minuet.

Our author, however, who is so blundering an arithmetician as to suppose that many cyphers will make a sum, adds a new nothing to the account, and infers from the silence of gazettes, that England can lose no services by this dismission. Have we heard of him, says he, p. 34. distinguishing himself in Germany, as we *did* of Mostyn and Waldegrave? Ergo, he ought to be broken. A man must have as bad a heart as this author, who could even wish to detract from the merit of those brave officers. Their country has signal

obligations to them. They contributed to that vastness of fame which made us the terror and admiration of the universe. Nor is it on gazettes alone that their reputation is founded. They are loved and admired by their profession, and by no man more than by general Conway, who would as little wish to raise his own glory at their expence, as those gentlemen would deign to countenance a scribbler in malicious insinuations. He names the plains of Minden. Does he know that the presence of mind and gallant conduct of general Waldegrave gave the decisive turn to the fate of that day? I speak of these officers, because I esteem them; not, like the author, to serve one party and depress another. Unless that had been his motive, why, in the number of our heroes, did he omit general Monckton, and forget lord Albemarle, the conqueror of the Havannah? Had this author ever ventured upon truth, he would not have denied that he had heard of general Conway in Germany. Was it a secret, though known to every officer in the army, that when the hereditary prince was wounded, general Conway was selected by prince Ferdinand to command in his place? Ask that idol of every Englishman's affection, the marquis of Granby, whether general Conway was an useless second? Ask Germany, whether prince Ferdinand recommends incapable and undeserving subjects to the favour of their master?—No; all this shall be sunk in malicious oblivion, and general Conway shall alone preside in councils of war at Wildman's, p. 34. where he never set his foot.

A fellow labourer in the same worthy cause, whose talent for poetry is upon a par with our author's logic, instead of giving the general a command at Wildman's, has, with as little truth, sent him to St. Cas, where, too, he never was. As the lines are worthy of the cause they are intended to serve, the bard will, I hope, forgive the liberty I take of re-printing them. When the author of the Address is appointed historiographer, his friend, I trust, will be made poet laureat. Here they are, and they do honour to the age!

In future annals should our children read  
That Conway's fate was such a day decreed,  
They'll turn some pages back the cause to find,  
Knowing that George was gracious, just, and kind:  
High in the list of faction's crew behold,  
A Rochfort gen'ral, Conway stands enroll'd!

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Whose coward's tongue a quick dismission claim'd  
 (His honour, valour, at St. Cas remain'd).  
 The stigma falls; our loyal children view  
 Repentment fall, where most repentment's due:  
 Great in his praise, they'll bless the happy hour,  
 When Britain's honour dar'd be king, and Pitt no more\*.

Such are the encouragements held out to virtue in the present times: such the productions of a party who breathe nothing but vengeance against the liberty of the press, as the vehicle of scandal and satire! Believe these men, and the opposition exceed all their predecessors in calumny—but read their own productions, and you will wonder at their confidence. Their writings teem with the most illiberal railing. Whoever scorns corruption, is the mark at which every dart is aimed from the janizaries of the faction. Look high, look low; is there a great man, is there a good man, who has escaped the arrows they shoot in the dark? Yet they, good men, complain of secret stabs. When there is a minister as virtuous as general Conway, and who has been *only as much* abused, I will allow that he has reason to harangue against invectives.

I now come to the last section: What detriment the public has received from the late dismission. This the author tells us has been in great measure forestalled. As far as nonsense can anticipate nonsense, that is, forbid the expectation of sense, this great logician has, indeed, already done the business, and might well caution us to throw by unread the sequel of his performance. Yet, it being my business to show that the public has been injured, I shall sift our casuist to the bottom, and leave him as naked of proof on this head, as I trust I have done on the two former.

His first argument is as inconclusive as all the rest. *If it appears to your satisfaction, says he, that neither the army has reason to complain, nor that he himself has been injured as a private citizen, it follows of course that the public, which must consider him in one of these two capacities, has not received any detriment.* Having confuted him in his two former positions, I might, perhaps, with reason rest the argument here, by his own concession; for, if in neither

\* Printed in the London Chronicle, Saturday March 26, 1764.

of the two former divisions he has satisfied the public, the result of two unsatisfied questions will certainly not be satisfaction. But Mr. Conway stands in a third light, in which any injury received by him affects the public in a higher degree than in either the character of soldier or private citizen. He is a member of the British parliament; a representative of the people of England, and one of the guardians of their liberties. He cannot be injured in that capacity, without a wound being given to his constituents, and to the people in general. The author had not forgotten this capacity, though he chose to sink it. He confesses in the next sentence to that in which he had omitted it, *that it may be urged speciously enough, that the general has suffered in the cause of his country, for maintaining that freedom which is our glory and our birthright. This, adds he, has been artfully enough endeavoured to be constantly insinuated.* How prevalent is truth, when it can force its way even through the mouth of falsehood! This we do assert was the probable cause of the dismissal: this the author's whole tract assigns as the cause, and this, perhaps, will some day or other be proved to have been the cause. In the mean time we defy this author, or his patrons, if he has any, to assign another. And if this *was* the cause, is the public not hurt, is liberty not wounded, the rights of parliament not violated, the freedom of debate not checked, integrity of conscience not oppressed? Answer, thou scribbler, and trifle not with the sacred rights of mankind—And how dost thou answer? By shifting and doubling, and changing the question, and setting up a phantom, which thou hast as little skill to combat as if it was a reality.

To prove general Conway was not alarmed for the liberty of the subject—that he was not conscientious in the part he took for declaring the warrants illegal—what does this man do? He gives an account of a foolish bill brought in on a subsequent day, and exploded by both sides of the house, and thence would infer that general Conway had not been in earnest on a serious debate on the Friday, because that simple bill was almost universally rejected on the Tuesday. This very argument was handled by some wise controvertist in the daily papers, was printed and reprinted with much solemnity, and some expence. It will not probably make its appearance again, after the full and fair answer I shall give to it.

In the first place, the bill was brought in by a gentleman whom the warm advocates for liberty, and the old friends of the house of Hanover, never peculiarly affected. They remembered something of a bar-gown put on to  
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plead for somebody of still less equivocal principles, and of subscriptions in defence of the king and constitution during the late rebellion, presented as illegal in Westminster-hall. The suspicious gentlemen of the minority perhaps *timebant Danaos et dona ferentes*; possibly their jealousy was increased by seeing a gentleman who had defended the legality of the warrants tender a bill for pronouncing them illegal. They were authorised too in this coolness towards the bill by the damp thrown on it by ministers themselves—And here it is proper to ask this blundering advocate a question, How came it to be in the power of the minority *not to suffer the point to be settled by bill*? Those are his very words, p. 37, and they are congenial with the rest of his assertions. I might ask him, how this rejection affects general Conway, who happened not to be present? How he knows which way the general would have voted if he had been present? If he answers, he supposes against the bill, I reply, he would then have voted with the ministry, who, being the majority, were those who rejected it. Now, has not this able sophist proved, that general Conway's conduct was not conscientious? Has not he satisfied you all, my countrymen, that you have received no detriment by the late dismission? Has not he proved that neither the army, nor the general himself, have been injured? And has not he vindicated the ministry as completely as it is possible to vindicate them? Lest his arguments should have slipped your memories, I will sum up the principal.

The duke of Bolton, lord Westmorland, and lord Cobham, were turned out of the army for being in opposition to the court: therefore it was right to dismiss general Conway, who was not in opposition.

This is a free country, in which it is inconsistent with the freedom of parliament for a minister to use bribes or threats; but when they have been employed without effect, it is right to use violence: therefore it was right to dismiss Mr. Conway.

Officers ought to rise by their behaviour in parliament; therefore it was right to dismiss Mr. Conway, who did not rise by his services in parliament.

General Conway was second in command at Rochfort; therefore he, on whom that expedition did not depend, ought to be cashiered for a single vote, while the principal commander, who votes with the court, is not cashiered.

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His name was not mentioned in the *gazettes* so often as general Mostyn's, or general Waldegrave's; therefore it was right to take away his regiment.

Mr. Conway gave no vote against the court when there was no division, and two votes to one with them when there was; therefore he was in opposition.

He had a large income from the army, and a less from his wife; therefore depriving him of the larger is no injury.

The minority would not suffer a bill to pass, which the majority rejected; therefore Mr. Conway had no conscience: consequently the public is not injured by the dismissal of a man, who would not have been dismissed if he had not been conscientious.

I check my pen at this last word, which, though uttered in raillery, is but too serious. I weep over my country, not over my friend—his honour is safe, would theirs were so!—But how will this story be read hereafter? How will posterity reconcile so much mercy with so much severity? When all proscriptions on rebels and jacobites are taken off; when we all enjoy a common parent; when every beam of mercy is directed to men so culpable, and every phial of wrath is reserved for a man so virtuous—how will they reconcile such apparent contradictions?—Why, by the exact and precise discriminations of truth. The mercy will be ascribed to that pure fount from whence alone it can flow; the rigour, to those ill-judging servants who establish such uncommon ideas of rewards and punishments.

I will now conclude with summing up my answer, which will be comprised in few words.

The late dismissal is prejudicial to the army, to the general, to the public, for these reasons:

1. It must slacken the zeal of officers, when they see that, after a life spent in the service, they are liable to be turned adrift, to satisfy the vengeance of ministers, and for causes no way connected with the profession. It affects the honour of officers, who are by this author declared the tools of a minister; it makes their fortune precarious and desperate, if they obey their conscience; and inclines men without doors to question the honour of those who vote  
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with the court, as a rod is held over their heads, and it is known that they act under fear of losing their employments. It indisposes their countrymen to choose them into parliament, as an officer can no longer be supposed a free agent.

2. The general is hurt in his fortune; he is deprived of the rewards of long and painful services; and he is treated with the same disgrace as men are treated in all countries who have proved themselves unworthy of their profession.

3. The public is hurt, if the rights of parliament are violated, and if punishment, which is only due to crimes, is inflicted on incorruptible honesty and conscientious virtue. It is hurt, if ministers revenge their own animosities on the servants of the king and the nation, and if they in effect declare, that to defend the liberties of the people subjects the guardians of those liberties to proscription.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.