

The Works Of the late Right Honorable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke

In Five Volumes, complete.

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VIII.

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made to Augustine, "I cannot abandon the religion of my " fathers, for one that you would perfuade me to receive on the " authority of persons quite unknown to me." He came however afterwards to a better fense, either by the supernatural effects of grace, or by the natural effects of the cajolement or importunity, perhaps, of BERTHE. The revelation of the law of nature is of another kind. Whether the word of God is his word may be, and we see has been, disputed by theists. But whether his works are his works, neither has been, nor can be, disputed by any fuch. Natural religion therefore being founded on human nature, the work of God, and on the necessary conditions of human happiness which are impofed by the whole fystem of it, every man who receives the law of nature receives it on his own authority, and not on the authority of other men known or unknown, and in their natural state as fallible as himself. The revelation is not communicated to him only by tradition and history: it is a perpetual, a standing revelation, always made, always making, and as present in these days, as in the days of ADAM, to all his off-spring. The external proofs then, for these are properly fuch, of the divine inftitution of the law of nature, are conclusive to every theist. Let us examine the internal, and compare them with the proofs that are contained in, or deduced from, the scriptures, to shew their divine original.

VIII. Wonder who are

OW the unwritten law of God, unwritten even in the hearts of men, how early foever inftinct disposes them to receive it, is an object of knowledge, not of belief. We know that God exists, with a certainty little inferior to that which we have of our own existence. We know that he has

has given us a law of our nature, with as great a certainty as inward consciousness and outward observation can give us: and by these means, by which we acquire all other science, it is in the power of every rational creature to acquire as much of this science as the ends of his being make it necessary that he should. Natural law is founded in reason, which every creature, that has it, may exercise, and the creature, that has it not, is not subject to the law. Christianity is founded in faith; and faith proceeds from grace. He, who has not faith, cannot fulfil a law that confifts, at least, as much in believing as in practifing: and whether he shall have grace, or no, does not depend on him. Thus the difference between the internal proofs of the two laws stands in one respect. The contents of the law of nature are objects of fuch a certainty as the author of nature alone can communicate. The contents of the whole christian fystem, laid down in our scriptures, are objects of fuch a probability as may force affent very reafonably, in this case, without doubt; altho a concurrence of various circumstances, improved by the credulity of some men and the artifice of others, has forced this affent in cases not very diffimilar, and wherein it would have been more reasonably withheld. The difference here stated, between the manifestations of the will of God to man in the law of nature and in every other law, is fo true, that every other law is controuled by it, and could not pass for the law of God if it was feen to be repugnant to the former. To fay nothing of the law given to ADAM, nor of that given to NOAH, according to the Jews, all orthodox writers think themselves obliged to hold, for the honor of the mosaical law, not only that there is nothing contrary to the natural law enjoined by it, " id quod ea lege praecipitur non esse contra jus naturae," as GROTIUS fays*, but also that all the obligations of the

* Lib. i. c. 1. De jure Bel. & Pac.

natural

natural law are contained in it, "contineri quidem in "facro illo corpore seu pentateucho," as Mr. Selden says; tho he owns at the same time that much chemical skill is necessary to extract them from it. That the christian law is nothing else than the law of nature, enforced by a new revelation, every friend to christianity admits, and the worst of it's enemies dares not deny, tho he denies the reality of the revelation.

ANOTHER internal proof of the divine original of the law of nature is the plainness and simplicity, which renders it intelligible in all times and all places alike, and proportions it to the meanest understanding. It has been made intricate by cafuiftry, that of lawyers and that of divines, as christian religion has been by theology. But there is a confiderable difference between the two cases. The first principles of natural religion are fo simple and plain, that casuistry has no apparent pretence to meddle with them, no more than it would have if it pretended to teach us to fee things that lie obvious before us, at a just distance, and exactly proportioned to our fight. These principles want neither paraphrase nor commentary, to be fufficiently understood; whereas the very first principles of christian religion, concerning the fall and redemption of man, are fo veiled in mystery of language, that without a comment, or with one, and even with that of St. PAUL, they give us no clear and distinct ideas, nor any thing more than forms of speech and words to pronounce. They who under this pretence, fuch as it is, introduce reafon where reason has nothing to do, explain what revelation has left unexplained, and define articles of faith which are either defined in the word of God, or which no mortal has any right to define, introduce afterwards their theology, under the name of moral theology, where that has nothing to

do, and corrupt the unwritten law of God even with less pretence than they corrupted the written. I charge this double corruption upon them the more boldly, because every one, who is in the least conversant in their writings, is able to bring numerous instances of both, and to shew, that I may keep to my prefent subject, how they have established doctrines and decided cases of conscience, in direct opposition to the most known and the most facred duties of natural religion, till they have rendered men infinitely worse than they would have been in Hobbes's state of nature, without any religion or law whatever. Two things alone have checked this torrent of iniquity, to some degree. The first has been the interposition of the civil power. The second has been the infuperable difficulty of determining men, generally and constantly, and out of some peculiar circumstances, to violate the laws of their nature, as individuals, or as members of fociety, by precept, by example, or by any authority whatever. The light of nature, like that of the fun, may be eclipfed: It cannot be extinguished.

Notwithstanding all the abuses of private and public morality, therefore, that the passions of some men may commit occasionally, and that the particular interest of others may invite them to propagate, even under the mask of religion, these two internal proofs of the divine institution of the law of nature, the conscious certainty that we have, and the plainness and simplicity of it, are in their full force, and superior to those of the same kind which any other revelation contains. It may seem strange to many that the plainness and simplicity of the law of nature should be brought as a proof of it's divinity. They have been accustomed to think that types, symbols, sigures, dark enigmatical expressions, and every thing that has the appearance of mystery, are effential

tial marks of a divine revelation. Such might a revelation made to superior Beings appear to us; and such would a reveation made to us concerning the divine nature, and the fecret oeconomy of the divine providence, not only appear to be, but really be, mysterious and unintelligible, and therefore no revelation at all. For this very reason, it is agreeable to all our ideas of wisdom to believe, that no such revelation was intended to be made to us. Such means could not be proportionable to any end. The all-wife Creator could not mean to inform his creatures unintelligibly, nor to leave an explanation of his nature, and of the whole oeconomy of his providence, to be made by men who undertake both prefumptuoufly, and who dishonor both, as far as man may be faid to honor or dishonor God, by all the filly paradoxes they advance dogmatically, and without having, for the most part, any just notions even of the wisdom and dignity of human conduct in fuperior forms of life. Such mysterious means then could not have been effectual, unless our improvement in metaphyfical knowledge had been the end of divine wifdom, which it would be impertinent to suppose: and if the end of this wifdom was to inform us of the divine will, to shew us the perfection of our nature, and to teach us to tend towards it in the pursuit of happiness, such means are quite unnecessary. They are, therefore, proportioned to no end. They are, therefore, unworthy of God.

CLEARNESS, precision, and a true conformity to the nature of things are the perfections of human, and much more of divine laws. Tho the nature of the universe, and the rules by which God proceeds in the government of every fystem contained in it, of ours among the rest, are unknown to us, yet is the nature of our own fystem, as far as the morality of actions is concerned, fufficiently known to us, and the laws

of our nature consequently, since they result from it. Here then is all the clearness, all the precision, and all the conformity to the nature of things that God can give, or man desire. From hence we may, and we ought, to form our judgment of all laws that are assumed to be divine. They must not be incomprehensible; because, tho they proceed from the divine intelligence, they are adapted to the human. God does not shew his own nature in them. He shews us our nature, and our duty; by the first of which we stand in the lowest relation of intellectual creatures to their Creator, and by the last in that of subjects and servants to a gracious and beneficent lord and master, who gives us laws neither ambiguous nor captious, and who commands us nothing which it is not our in terest to perform.

ANOTHER internal proof of the divinity of natural law must not be passed over without mention. As all is simple and plain, nothing is mean nor trifling in it. This religion shews us a Supreme Being, veiled in the majesty of his nature, but manifested in all his works, to be the true and only true object of our adoration. In the existence he has given us, and in the benefits that attach us fo strongly to it, this religion shews him to be the first and greatest object of our gratitude; in the established order of things, subject to so many vicissitudes and yet fo constant, to be the reasonable, as well as necessary object of our refignation; and finally in the wants, diffreffes, and dangers, which these viciflitudes bring frequently upon us, to be the comfortable object of our hope: in which hope, the religion of nature will teach us, no doubt, to address ourfelves to the Almighty, in a manner confistent with an entire refignation to his will, as fome of the heathen did. But this religion will not teach us to pray, as if we informed omniscience, or expostulated with omnipotence, as those who pre-Vol. V.

tend to be the most reformed among christians are accustomed to do; nor to make religion a fervice of shew and outward gesture, as your pretended catholic church has done. The religion of nature teaches to worship God in spirit and in truth, that is inwardly and fincerely. It neither confounds spiritual pride and enthusiasm, nor theatrical pomp and superstitious rites, with devotion. Fraud, envy, malice, filent and fecret vices, more dangerous often to fociety than those of greater eclat, have lurked behind the former. The latter, tho they affect the fenses without touching the heart, have passed in general, and still pass, for divine worship. God has been ferved, in a manner which the most fanguinary tyrant would abhor, by fome people. By others, with all the circumstances of that low adulation which earthly monarchs require, and whereof the priefts themselves have claimed a share. That there is a middle proceeding fit to be observed, between a theatrical worship and a worship stripped of all outward solemnity and pomp, I am ready to admit. In this, and in a multitude of cases, the law of nature or right reason may approve fuch laws and institutions as nature or reason has not prescribed; because they may be proper, and even necessary means to promote the observation of this law. But then they ought to pass for forms directed to this purpose, for human not for divine ordinances. Let the prieft wear a ridiculous cap and breaft-plate, or fringes and bells on his robe, but let it not be faid that the Supreme Being took care of his attire, or that fuch trifles as these were the institutions of divine wifdom.

THERE is nothing in the law of nature unworthy the author of it; and much less can it, or does it, contain any thing inconsistent with itself. The rules by which God governs even the system to which we belong are unknown to us; but this

we know most certainly, that he cannot command in particular, what he forbids in general. He who has made benevolence to all rational beings the fundamental law of our nature, can never command some to rob, or to murder others; to usurp on the rights of their fellow creatures, and to exterminate whole nations. In fhort, the internal proofs of the divinity of the law of nature, both positive and negative, are fuch as render this law the true criterion of every law and religion that pretend to the fame original. It may be disputed, perhaps, whether our abstract notions of the moral fitness and unfitness of things afford a sufficient rule, whereby to judge of the truth of any religion that is faid to come from God. But there is no room to dispute, whether the conformity or nonconformity of fuch a religion to that law which God has given to all his human creatures, enacted in the constitution of their nature, and discernible by the use of those faculties he has given them likewise, is a rule sufficient for this purpose. Was it otherwise, we should have no sufficient rule at all. Men might dispute eternally about the dictates of right reason, and the will of God would be entirely out of the question; or it would be made determinable by an indeterminable question, what those eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things are, according to which, and in a dependency on which, the will of God must proceed, and be fignified to his creatures. That this would be fo, is evident in the different opinions that have been entertained, ever fince theology was made a science, concerning the existence of evil as well as good, and concerning the distribution of them. But if we confine ourselves to the revelation God has made of his will in his works, and to the knowledge we have that his will is necessarily determined by his wisdom, we shall have a certain and sufficient rule by which to judge of his laws. What is the will of God, is a question 0 2

question easily answered. What ought this will to be, is a question we cannot presume to answer without absurdity and impiety both. To answer the first, we need to go no higher than the moral obligations that arise in our own system, and of which we have very adequate ideas. To answer the last, we must go up to the nature of the author of nature, and to a multitude of other natures, the affuming of which puts the Supreme Being just in the case of his creature man. The nature of the human fystem is independent on man; and yet he is obliged to derive the rules of his conduct from it. Just so, upon this affumption, the abstract natures and eternal effences of things are independent on God; and yet God was obliged to make, and is obliged to govern his fystem according to them.

By employing our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature, physical and moral, and by contemplating feriously and frequently the laws that are plainly, and even necessarily, deducible from thence, we may acquire not only a particular knowledge of these laws, but a general, and in fome fort an habitual, knowledge of the manner in which God is pleased to exercise his supreme power in this system, beyond which we have no concern. We do not fee the divine painter, if I may employ fo low a comparison on fo high a fubject; but we grow accustomed to his manner, and we learn to despise those who present us a fign-post dawbing, and call it impudently the work of RAPHAEL.

IX.

S certain, as plain, as important and as confiftent as the law of nature is, it has been blended with many abfurd and contradictory laws, in all ages and countries, by legislators who published them, sometimes in their own name,