

## The Works Of the late Right Honorable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke

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XXXVII.

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lapsed into almost the same iniquity, that the end of all things should be at hand. He would have proceeded, no doubt, in much the same style, if Mandanis, the head of the order, had not imposed silence on him, and, calling Onesicaltus to himself from Calanus, had not talked with great decency and good sense, in a manner, and on subjects proper for the greek to report to his prince. Thus the history of the fall, and all the circumstances of it are proved reasonable and probable.

## XXXVII.

UR author takes a little more pains to shew, that the doctrine of the redemption of mankind is agreeable to reason. Having assumed, which he calls proving, that the moral attributes of God, and the notions and expectations of fome wife men among the heathens, make it reasonable to believe God did make, feventeen hundred years ago, a revelation of his will to mankind, as if mankind stood in more need of a revelation four thousand years after their race began, than at any other period; as if the moral attributes of God were not the fame, four thousand years before, when he made the first revelation of his will, in the constitution of nature, and finally, as if the notions and expectations of Socrates and PLATO, fupposing these philosophers to have had them really, proved any thing more than their defire of more knowledge than God thought proper to give them the means of acquiring; having affumed all this, I fay, he proceeds to argue in this manner\*. Some facrifice or expiation for fin was neceffary to be appointed, " to shew God's irreconcileable

\* Evid. p. 263 et fequ.

" hatred

"hatred to it. Repentance might not be fufficient. God " would not be appealed without some punishment and fa-" tisfaction; and yet he would accept some other than the " destruction of offenders. This appears, in the custom of "facrificing, to have been the universal apprehension of " mankind:" and, from this universal apprehension, he concludes, that "the doctrine of the redemption is plainly " agreeable to right reason." Thus are these great masters of reason reduced to propose the most gross abuses for the true dictates of it. Thus are the most absurd notions which superstition ever spred, in contradiction to the law of nature and reason, applied to the proceedings of God with man; made the measure of divine justice by philosophers who determine and define the moral attributes of the deity; and established as foundations of the christian system, by divines who pretend, and who are hired to defend it. Notions which directed a principal part of idolatrous worship are fanctified, and the most inhuman rites are rendered the most meritorious; for if it was agreeable to found reason, to think that God would not be appealed unless some blood was spilled, he who shed that of beasts to expiate sins did well, but he who shed that of his children did better. He brought the punishment nearer to himself: and the Phenician had the advantage, in this respect, of the Israelite. He erred, whatever he facrificed, by the mifapplication of a true principle, when he facrificed to Moloch. But the Ifraelite, who did not misapply the principle, would have pursued it more agreeably to found reason, and the unprejudiced light of nature, if he had facrificed his fon, as ABRAHAM was ready to do, or his daughter like JEPHTHAH. God was pleased to accept of an expiation that cost offenders less to make, under the mosaical dispensation, as the scriptures tell us. But the same scriptures prove evidently, that the reason of the thing goes as far as I carry it; fince, under the christian dispensation, God caused the expiation for fin to be made by the sufferings and death of his own Son; than which nothing can be imagined, as CLARKE \* assures us, more honorable and worthy of the Supreme Lord and Governor of all things.

We weigh these matters in the ballance of human reason, to which the appeal is made, if men who decide can be said to appeal, even tho they affirm that God condescends to do so. They are resulted, therefore, if they have not reason, as well as revelation, on their side: and the charge of weakening the cause of the latter, whilst they presume to defend it by the former, is made out against them. Let us proceed, with a due respect for revelation, and with no more than it deserves for their reasoning.

I fay then, tho we should allow men were in the right to think universally that God exacted some bloody expiation for sin, and that repentance, which the law of nature points out, was not sufficient, yet even this concession would not justify the doctrine of the redemption of mankind at the bar of reason. The heathens thought, that the sacrifice of an ox, or a son, or a daughter, would atone for sins. Therefore, it is plainly agreeable to the universal reason of mankind, signified by this universal apprehension, to believe that God sent his only begotten Son, who had not offended him, to be facrificed by men, who had offended him, that he might expiate their sins, and satisfy his own anger. Surely our ideas of moral attributes will lead us to think, that God would have been satisfied, more agreeably to his mercy and goodness, without any expiation, upon the repentance of the offenders, and

\*. Ib. p. 268.

more

more agreeably to his justice with any other expiation rather than with this. The heathen divines were accustomed to think and speak of their gods much after the manner of men. If one of them, therefore, had arisen from the dead, he would have concurred readily with Clarke in the maxim, that the moral attributes are the same in the divine nature, as they are in our ideas. But then, he would have challenged the doctor to produce an example, in the pagan system, of a god facrificing his son to appease himself, any more than of a god who was himself his own father and his own son. Saturn, he might say, did indeed offer up his son in facrifice: but he did it to appease Coelus, not himself.

WHEN our divine is about to establish, "that there is a fit-"ness and unfitness of certain circumstances to certain persons "founded in the nature of things, and in the qualifications of "persons; he says, that this must be acknowledged by every one "who will not affirm that it is equally fit . . . that an innocent "being should be extremely and eternally miserable, as that it "fhould be free from fuch misery". The proposition is true without dispute, tho it is not true that we can always discern this fitness and unfitness. Let us join iffue with the learned person here, and add, to strengthen the maxim, that there is the fame unfitness, in the case supposed, whether the misery be asfumed eternal, or not. Let us ask now, whether the truth of this maxim, the innocence of the Lamb of God, and the fufferings and ignominious death of Christ, can be reconciled together and how? The nicest casuist would, I think, be puzzled; but our casuist goes on most dogmatically, and shews no more regard to the dignity than to the innocence of the divine person who died on the cross. He does, indeed, allow that no one can certainly fay, that God might not have pardoned fin upon repentance without any facrifice. But he

pronounces this method of doing it, by the death of CHRIST, to be more wife and fit for feveral prudential reasons. Read them, they would appear futile and impertinent if applied to human councils; but in their application to the divine councils they become prophane and impious. Nay, it would not be hard to shew, that this method was more proper to produce a contrary effect, than that which is assigned as a reason for taking it. For instance, the death of CHRIST, it is said, was proper to discountenance prefumption, and to discourage men from repeating their transgressions. Surely, it would not be hard to shew by reason, that the death of Christ might, and by fact, that it has countenanced presumption without discouraging men from repeating their transgressions. But I shall not descend into particulars that are trifling and tedious, and that would render a full answer to them little better. A general reflection, or two, may ferve, and are as much as they all deferve.

Tho I am far from approving the practice of those who compare fo frequently the divine with the human oeconomy and policy, and who build on the last their hypothetical schemes of the first; yet on this occasion, and to frame an argument ad hominem, it may be properly done. Let us suppose then, a great prince governing a wicked and rebellious people. He has it in his power to punish, he thinks fit to pardon them. But he orders his only and beloved fon to be put to death to expiate their fins, and to fatisfy his royal vengeance. Would this proceeding appear to the eye of reason, and in the unprejudiced light of nature, wife, or just, or good? No man dares to fay that it would, except he be a divine; for CLARKE does in effect fay that it would; fince he imputes this very proceeding to God, and justifies it not implicitely on the authority of revelation, but explicitely on the VOL. V. Pp

authority of reason, which may be applied to man as well as to God, and as a particular instance of the general rule that is, according to him, common to both. Allow me one reflection more.

CLARKE acknowledges readily, that human reason could never have discovered such a method as this for the reconciliation of finners to an offended Gop. But if reason could not have discovered it, how comes it to pass that reason finds no fuch difficulty nor inconceivableness in it, as to make a wife man call the truth of it in question? the truth of a wellattested revelation, he fays. But here he plays the sophist. He is to prove the method agreeable to found unprejudiced reason, independently of revelation. No matter how it came to be known, is it reasonable, is it agreeable to a fitness, founded in the nature of things, and in the qualifications of persons? That is the point to be considered. To consider it as reasonable relatively to the revelation of it, is not to appeal to unprejudiced, but to prejudiced reason. It is in plain terms to beg the question shamefully. Heathen theology was licentious enough in all conscience. The professors of it gave an extravagant loofe to their imaginations, passed all the bounds of probability, and scarce kept within those of conceivable posfibility. Thus they came very near to fuch a fystem as this: fo near, that there was little more to be added, but this little, they did not think fo highly of the human, and fo lowly of the divine nature, as was necessary to make them add it. AESCULAPIUS came down from heaven, conversed in a visible form with men, and taught them the art of healing diseases\*. The passage is cited from Julian by Clarke, in order to shew, according to his laudable custom, that there is nothing

\* Ib. p. 268.

in the christian system which we may not believe on grounds of reason; because there is nothing in it more incredible than what the least reasonable men that ever were, wild metaphyficians, heathens, heretics, apostates, have believed. It may be cited more properly to fhew, what I mean to fhew by it, how easy and short a transition might have been made by heathen divines, in the rage that possessed them all of framing complete schemes of the whole order and state of things, from a god teaching physic to a god teaching theology. The most ignorant and favage of them, like the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians, who have been already mentioned, for they were all superstitious alike, came a little nearer to the doctrine of redemption. But even they did not come up to it entirely. They meaned to encourage the pious practice of facrificing their children; for pious it was on the principle of expiation by shedding of blood: but there was a great difference between the conceptions they had of their gods, and those which christians have of the Father and the Son. Their gods had been men, and SATURN was a man when he facrificed his fon. Their ideas of human government led them to notions of divine mediations, and of expiations by shedding of blood, which were so many particular redemptions. But nothing in the reason of the thing, nor in the most superstitious of their prejudices, could lead them to imagine fo much rigor in one god, as to exact that another should be facrificed even by men who meaned no expiation, and in whom it was a murder, not a facrifice; nor fo much humility and condescention in another as to make him fubmit to be this divine victim. They could not imagine any thing fo repugnant as this to all their ideas of order, of justice, of goodness, and in short, of theism; the they imagined many other things that were really inconfistent with all these ideas. Those of them, therefore, who embraced this doctrine, after it had been revealed, em-Pp 2

braced it, not because they found no difficulty nor inconceivableness in it, which CLARKE was to prove by proving it agreeable to found reason, but merely because it was part of a relation they believed true, for reasons of another kind; which is nothing to his purpose under this head of argument.

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LL that he fays more than I have observed upon it; all that follows about the importance of this world of ours, which it is affumed was made for the fake of man, and which, we are told, is as confiderable and worthy of the divine care as most other parts of our system, which is likewise as confiderable as any other fingle fystem in the universe, in order to take off the objection arising from the meanness of the creature; and finally all that follows about the manifestations of God, and the discoveries of his will, supposed to have been made by the same divine Logos to other beings in other fystems, in order to take off the imputation of partiality from the Creator; all this, I fay, is a rhapfody of prefumptuous reasoning, of prophane absurdities disguised by epithets, of evalions that feem to answer whilst they only perplex, and in one word of the most arbitrary and least reasonable suppositions. I will bring but one instance more of the excellent manner in which the author of the Evidences proves, that all things necessary to be believed, in order to falvation, or closely connected with these, are most agreeable to sound unprejudiced reason. He proposes\* the objection drawn from the want of univerfality to the christian revelation. He had pro-

\* Ib. p. 215. 216, 217, et 273.

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