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**The Works Of the late Right Honorable Henry St. John,  
Lord Viscount Bolingbroke**

In Five Volumes, complete.

**Bolingbroke, Henry St. John**

**London, 1754**

An Answer to the London Journal of Saturday, December 21, 1728

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A N  
A N S W E R

T O T H E

London Journal\* of Saturday, December 21,  
1728.

**T**HE family of the PUBLICOLAE are surely very numerous. I pretend to no acquaintance with them, and I desire none. Far be it from me therefore to assign to any one of the fraternity his particular lucubration. I do not presume to say, for instance, that such a piece was writ by BEN, or such a one by ROBIN; but I can plainly distinguish, in their productions, a difference of style and character. In some, I feel myself lulled by a regular, mild, and frequently languid harangue; such as often descends upon us from the pulpit. In others, I observe a crude, incoherent, rough, inaccurate, but sometimes sprightly declamation; well enough fitted for popular assemblies, where the majority is already convinced.

The PUBLICOLA of the seventh of December quite jaded me. I handled the numbfish till I fancied a torpor seized my imagination; and perhaps you may think, that I am hardly yet recovered from the consequences of that accident. However, I shall venture to play a little with the PUBLICOLA of this day;

\* This paper was supposed to be then under the direction of BENJAMIN lord  
bishop of \*\*\*\*\* for

for I think I can go through an answer to his paper. He returns the ball at least, and keeps up the game.

BEFORE I come to this, give me leave to premise a word or two more.

As different as the PUBLICOLAE are in other things, in one they are all alike. They are scurrilous and impatient. They call names, and grow angry at a sneer. RALEIGH laid down his pen, rather than continue such a bear-garden contest. I took it up and answered them for once in their own style; but they must not expect so much complaisance from me any more. The matters we enter upon are serious, and by me they shall be treated seriously and calmly. I shall consider the dignity of the cause I plead for; the cause of truth; the cause of my country; and I shall look down with contempt on the invectives and menaces, which they may throw out; and by which they will suit their style with great propriety to their subject. ---But let us come to the point.

THE PUBLICOLA of this day sets out with stating, in an half light, a question which hath been much debated in the world. No man that I know of, no reasonable man I am sure, did ever find fault that we avoided a war. Our national circumstances are so well known, they are so severely felt, that ministers who maintained peace, and procured to their country the blessings of peace, quiet, improvement of trade, diminution of taxes, decrease of debts, would be almost the objects of public adoration. But the exception taken to our conduct hath been this; that we provoked a war first, and shewed a fear of it afterwards. People recal the passages of three years past. They wish we had practised greater caution at that time; but then the same people very consistently wish that we had

exerted greater vigor since. If the honor and interest of his late majesty, and of the British nation, say they, were so severely wounded by the public or private treaties of Vienna, that it was fit to keep no longer any measures, even such as have been thought of decency, with the emperor and the king of Spain; why this fear of disobliging them? Why this long forbearance under all the insults offered to us by the Spaniards? If we were in a condition, by our own strength, and by our alliance with France, to enter with a prospect of success into an immediate war; why again have we chosen to defer it, under so many provocations to begin it? Why have we endured some of the worst consequences of a war, without taking those advantages which acting offensively would undeniably have procured to us? But if all this was quite otherwise, continue the same political reasoners; if the honor and interest of his late majesty, and of the British nation, were not so severely wounded; if we were neither, by our own strength, nor by the alliance of France, in a condition to risque a war; nay more, if things were so unfortunately jumbled, that perhaps "this war would have been more to our own detriment than to that of our enemies," as the PUBLICOLAE have more than once insinuated in their papers, what could we mean three years ago, when matters were carried to greater and harsher extremities than it is possible to find any example of among civilized nations, since the quarrels of CHARLES the fifth, and FRANCIS the first? If our "principal ally would have been dangerous to our interests in the operations of a war, and is indifferent to them in the negotiations of peace," for this hath been insinuated too from the same quarter, what a treaty was that which procured us this ally? What assurances were those which made us depend upon him? The difficulty of these dilemmas cannot, I think, be solved; and those who attempt it deceive themselves, whilst they mean to deceive the people.

BUT

BUT we are told that we went into a war, as far as the reason of things would give us leave. It seems then that the reason of things would neither give us leave to protect our trade, nor to make reprizals, when our merchants were plundered. If these words are to pass for any thing more than empty sound, it will follow either that PUBLICOLA is capable of affirming the grossest untruth in a paper, addressed to the people of England; or that our situation is worse than the least sanguine of our friends ever thought it, or the most malicious of our enemies ever represented it. Very bad indeed must it be, if the reason of things obliged us to bear from the Spaniards, at this low ebb of their maritime power, what would not have been borne when their proud armada covered the seas; what would hardly have been borne, even in the reign of king JAMES the first.

BUT, GOD be praised! this is not our case; and therefore PUBLICOLA must be content to lie under the imputation which he hath drawn on himself by the boldness of his assertions.

HE is frequently guilty of this fault; and the words which immediately follow those I have quoted, afford a strong instance of it. "We did not, says he, take the galleons and bring them home; but we blocked them up; which as completely answered the true end and design of sending that fleet, as the actual taking of them. The design was to keep the money out of their hands (the Spaniards) and so disable them to carry on the project of the treaty of Vienna." Very well. This matter is brought to a short issue. The blockade of the galleons is over. Our fleet is come back from the West-Indies. The galleons are either come or coming. The Spaniards therefore are, according to PUBLICOLA, no longer disabled from carrying on the project of the Vienna treaty.

treaty. I ask then, have they abandoned, have they renounced these projects? If our fleet blocked up the gallcons till this was done, he is in the right. This answered the design of sending it. If they should, after this, break their faith, and renounce the most sacred obligations, none but they are to be complained of.

PUBLICOLA would have us believe, indeed, that they have renounced these projects; that they have granted us the main things in dispute; and that the congress is only to settle other affairs of less importance. But this I deny; and he shall be obliged to confess either that he advances, here again, a bold untruth; or that he reckons our keeping Gibraltar not amongst the main things in dispute, but amongst those of less importance. Let him shew me, if he can, in the preliminaries, a particular and express confirmation of our right to this place, made by the Spaniards. I will undertake to shew him the general words, by which the Spaniards will pretend in the congress, as it is notorious they do every where and on all occasions, that they have still a right to demand the restitution of Gibraltar, and that this right is to be discussed in the congress.

I KNOW it hath been said more than once, in a very public place, and in a very solemn manner, that Gibraltar should not be even mentioned at the congress; but it would be impertinent to lay any stress on the assurances of a person, who hath presumed to give so many groundless ones already; and who either hath been bantered most egregiously himself, or hath made no scruple of bantering his country.

HERE then is one main point of our interests, to mention no more, still unsettled; not because the Spaniards have flown off from any agreement they had come to with us about it;

but because it was never settled; and yet the galleons are left at liberty to come home.

IF asserting our right to Gibraltar, and some other things, which were founded so high by an acquaintance of yours, Mr. PUBLICOLA (the author of the Enquiry) had no share in the ends which were proposed by sending our fleet to the West-Indies, such strange incomprehensible ends may, for aught I know, have been completely answered: but if these points, so essential to Great Britain, were any of the main things in dispute; if they were any of the ends proposed by what is called distressing the Spaniards; then is it false to assert that these ends have been completely answered.

WHEN we consider what numbers of able and useful subjects his majesty hath lost in the expedition to the West-Indies; and that we are, at least, as far off from a settlement of interests with Spain now, as we were before that expedition was undertaken, it is impossible not to feel great and unaffected concern.

IF it be asked, what was to be done? I shall answer that, perhaps, it little becomes a private man to determine such great questions; but I will proceed to shew that all which PUBLICOLA advances against taking the galleons, is trifling.

FIRST then, if blocking up the galleons in the Spanish ports was of such consequence, taking them would have been a more effectual measure to all the same purposes.

SECONDLY, if we had taken them, as it is certain that Mr. HOSIER could have done with ease, and with all their treasure on board, immediately on his first arrival, we should have had  
a chance

a chance the more for taking the flota too, which stole away to Europe, whilst our squadron lay rotting before Porto-Bello.

THIRDLY, if we had taken this treasure, we should have had in our hands a sufficient security for indemnifying our merchants, who have been the only sufferers, by the depre- dations of the Spaniards, whilst the French and Dutch have sailed securely; and to one body of whom, I mean the South-Sea company, the king of Spain owes, for former seizures un- justly made, as much perhaps as his proportion in the treasure of the galleons amounts to.

FOURTHLY, to have taken the galleons would not have been liable to the same inconveniencies, as we have severely felt by pursuing another measure. The expedition would have been soon over. The expence of lives and treasure would have been infinitely less. It would have cost little or nothing to have kept the Spaniards out of their money by a seizure, as long as the true reason of things should have required it; whereas it hath cost us more than all that money is worth, to keep them out of it by a blockade only for a time; and for a time, which hath not been sufficient to secure us against their designs, or to make them lay aside their pretensions. "But if we had taken them, says PUBLICOLA, we should have taken the money of other people, as well as of the Spaniards. We should have been pyrates." Let us see how this hangs together. If we had restored immediately to the proprietors their respective shares, as he supposes we must have done, the brand of py- racy would not have stuck upon us. But suppose we had thought fit not to restore their shares to the Spaniards, till our differences with the court of Madrid had been settled; should we have been pyrates in that case? He will be laughed at who affirms it. Would the king of Spain's share in this treasure



have been no loss to him? would he not have missed the extravagant indulto, which he is now going to receive on this immense treasure? Should we have been pirates for punishing, in this manner, a prince, who actually besieged one of our fortresses, who actually detained the ships and seized the estates of our merchants, and whose subjects every day killed, robbed and plundered the subjects of Great Britain?

BUT I go a step farther; for if we stop with PUBLICOLA, it will be always short of the mark, and we shall never exhaust the subject, as I desire to do, because I desire to find the truth, and to be sure that I find it. What hath been said hitherto, hath been said on the supposition of a seizure only; and I hope the scruples of PUBLICOLA's timorous conscience are appeased. I hope he hath found out, by this time, that such a seizure might have been carried on without piracy. But suppose it had been a capture, not a seizure; such a capture as can never be made but in time of open war; such a capture as intitles the captors, by our laws, to the whole profit of the prize. Why then we had commenced a war against Spain by this action, as Spain had done long before against us by a thousand hostilities. Why then vice-admiral HOSIER, and the officers and seamen of his squadron, had been in the same case as Sir CHARLES WAGER, and the officers and seamen of his squadron were in the last war; and I do not remember that these gallant men were ever prosecuted as pirates at home; or reputed such abroad, or obliged to refund any part of the treasure they had taken.

UPON the whole matter, PUBLICOLA's argument proves nothing in the present case; or it proves that even when we are at war with Spain, we must not presume to attack these sacred galleons. Other nations are always interested in them, as well

well as the Spaniards. It will therefore be always unlawful, according to this excellent casuist, to make prize of them: and he is defied to distinguish himself out of this absurdity.

HAVING now gone through what Mr. PUBLICOLA calls, I know not why, the subject in general, we will examine the second part of his epistle. I pass over all the Billingsgate with which he ushers in this part; tho' I could make myself and you too very merry, if I would apply his criticisms on what RALEIGH says, concerning one promise, to the interpretation which was given to another promise; by which we might have learned, amongst many other curious distinctions, the difference between a direct promise and a promise ministerially worded: but I shall leave him to his phrenzy, and proceed soberly to shew you that he says nothing, or that which is worse than nothing, in every line of this performance; in which he seems to triumph with such vast complacency.

THE point he labors is to shew that the promise made by the lord STANHOPE to restore Gibraltar, which hath not been complied with, and the destruction of the Spanish fleet on the coast of Sicily, threw the court of Madrid into the arms of the emperor, and were the true root and real cause of all that thorough hatred and deep malice shewn in the treaty of Vienna; and by consequence that all our present difficulties with Spain proceed from hence; from causes laid many years ago, and when the present ministers were not in power. My business shall not be to blame or to excuse any ministers; but to make a true deduction of facts, and to reason clearly and justly upon them; and I charitably hope, that I may bring PUBLICOLA to do so in time; if for no other reason, at least by obliging him to take shame to himself so often: for tho' I am not so bloody-minded as PUBLICOLA, who talks as if he had  
heads

heads in his power, yet I assure him, that I will not let him alone whilst, amongst other enormities, he makes it his business to bury truth and common sense under such weekly heaps of rubbish.

I SHALL shew immediately that, in whatever terms or manner we suppose lord STANHOPE to have made a promise of restoring Gibraltar to the Spaniards, it will be of no avail to PUBLICOLA'S purpose. But since he hath told us what he hath heard, and RALBIGH hath told us what he hath heard, for neither of them can pretend to speak on their own knowledge concerning this affair, I will likewise take leave to state what I have been informed of, upon better authority than what my adversary hath often writ upon in his affirmative style.

I HAVE been informed then, that lord STANHOPE had been induced, or seduced, call it which you please, by the late regent of France, to make an overture of this kind at the court of Madrid. Lord STANHOPE, says our author, might think that Gibraltar was to be "honestly given up for valuable considerations." He might so; and he was so honest a man, so sincere a lover of his country, that if he had thought in another manner, no consideration of private interest, no regard to the service of a ministry, could have prevailed on him to make, nor even to entertain the motion. But have a care of your insinuations, Mr. PUBLICOLA; and learn to make them with a little more delicacy. The case is vastly different now. The sense of our august monarch is known. The sense of the whole nation hath been loudly proclaimed; and I believe no minister, how presuming soever, will venture, at this time, to say that Gibraltar may be honorably or advantageously given up; and therefore no virtuous minister will think he can honestly give it  
up,

up, or conspire in measures which may create the appearance of a necessity so to do.---But to return to my narration.

IF such an overture was made by lord STANHOPE, it was made to prevail on the court of Spain to desist from the enterprize they had then in hand; an enterprize, which we should have been obliged to prevent, if the treaty of quadruple alliance had never been made, by virtue of our guaranty to the neutrality of Italy. That this overture was not received is evident; since the Spaniards went on with their expedition, which ended in the destruction of their fleet. Now call this an overture, as I do; or call it a promise, as PUBLICOLA will affect to do; it was vacated to all intents and purposes by the Spaniards, who refused to comply with the condition on which it was and only could be grounded.

IT hath been said by some, that this promise was renewed afterwards, to pacify the Spaniards for the loss of their ships, and for their defeat in Sicily: but this deserves explanation; and will not stand in the light which those who urge it desire it should.

IT is, I believe, true, that the French, who first induced us to make this overture, would, on the pretences just now mentioned, and on the pretence of the hopes which the regent had continued to give the Spaniards, have obliged us to acknowledge this vacated promise as a subsisting obligation; but I have been informed, that this was refused flatly to the minister sent over hither upon that occasion, and to the regent himself by our minister abroad. The promise then continued vacated; and we were as much disentangled from the snares which our good allies laid for us, as if no such promise or overture had been ever made.

BUT farther. If a promise of this kind had been made on our part, even after the expedition to Sicily, which there is no color to affirm, yet that promise must likewise have been void, since it was made so, to all intents and purposes, by the king of Spain's accession to the \* quadruple alliance.

THAT all possessions are mutually confirmed by that treaty, except such as are specified in it, cannot be denied. The possession of Gibraltar was therefore again confirmed to us by the king of Spain, when he acceded to that treaty; unless he can shew that our possession of it was excepted, or can produce any private article or declaration, which made a reservation of his right to this place, notwithstanding the cession of it made at Utrecht. But nothing of this can be shewn; and it hath been said, I believe truly, that a contrary declaration was made solemnly and publicly by the British minister in Holland, at the very time when the accession was signed.

THUS far then the way is clear before us. When we came mediators to the congress of Cambray (for such we were at that place, tho we have the misfortune to find ourselves principally and almost solely concerned in the disputes to be settled at Soissons) the king of Spain had no right, nor pretence of right to demand of Great Britain the restitution of Gibraltar. Indeed, if he had then such a pretence; if a promise, on our part, to restore this place to him, which promise we refused to execute, had then subsisted, how could he have accepted of our mediation?

Ay, but (says this poor hunted author, who doubles and shifts and works and tries, at any rate, to save himself) lord

\* Vide the treaty.

STANHOPE, according to RALPH'S own confession, was first in this affair, and laid the foundation of this expectation in the Spaniards.---It is plain the Spaniards had such assurances. It is allowed you, at least for argument sake, that lord STANHOPE was first in this affair. The Spaniards had such assurances. Make your most of it. These assurances were discharged. These promises were released; and whatever lord STANHOPE can be supposed to have done or said about Gibraltar, hath no more relation to the present dispute, than what was done or said about Gibraltar in the time of king RODRIGUE and the count JULIAN: so that our author is building up a right for the Spaniards upon foundations which were demolished as soon as laid. He is building up a right, or he is building up nothing; for to talk, as he does, of expectations, in cases of this nature, without establishing a right, real or plausible, is too frivolous to deserve an answer.

LET me illustrate this by a familiar instance; for things cannot be made too plain to him. I will suppose him a clergyman. I will suppose that by merit, of some kind or other, he gets a promise of a bishoprick. After this, he does something inconsistent with such a promotion. He forfeits all title. He renounces all pretensions to it. Shall his advocate be admitted to insist that, notwithstanding all this, he expects to be a bishop still; and, instead of grounding his expectations on his right, ground his right on his expectations? No certainly; such an advocate would be hissed out of court, and would deserve at least to have his gown pulled over his ears.

BUT the Spaniards are not so chimerical. They ground their expectations, and what they call their right, on a new engagement taken by us, as they say, since all the transacti-

ons, mentioned above, were over; on a private article, in a treaty made with them in 1721, stipulating the contents of a letter to be written by the late king; and on the letter, written in pursuance of this article, the original of which they offer to produce; and which they pretend to be a positive engagement to restore Gibraltar to them

WITH what front now could PUBLICOLA affirm, that what RALEIGH says about the letter is nothing to his purpose; unless this mysterious letter had been wrote before this same kind of a verbal promise was made?---If this mysterious or ministerial letter had been writ before lord STANHOPE's promise was made, it would have been nothing to RALEIGH's purpose; because his purpose was to shew, that the demand which the Spaniards now make of Gibraltar, cannot be made on any thing which passed in lord SHANHOPE's time; but it was extremely to his purpose to shew that this letter was writ after lord STANHOPE's death. Had PUBLICOLA taken upon him to ridicule the plainest and easiest demonstration in EUCLID, he could not have rendered himself more ridiculous than he does upon this occasion.

I AM at a loss what words to use. I have debarred myself from using hard ones; and none but the hardest are equal to what this writer deserves. Let him pass then without any animadversion from me. Let the reader pronounce sentence upon him.

To sum up the whole on this head. PUBLICOLA was to prove that my lord STANHOPE's promise to restore Gibraltar, is one of the reasons of the present obstinacy of the Spaniards, and by consequence of our present difficulties. Now it is notorious that in fact the Spaniards ground their demand on some-

something which passed whilst he was alive. PUBLICOLA says, it never appeared that the present ministry came into such assurances. If he means the assurances given by my lord STANHOPE, and long ago made null, he is most certainly in the right, for a very obvious reason. But if he means the assurances still insisted upon, I have nothing to say but this. These assurances, or what the Spaniards call by that name, were given in the year of our Lord 1721.

THE second reason assigned, by this profound politician, for the obstinacy of the Spaniards, is the resentment which hath lain at their hearts, ever since we destroyed their fleet. Here are no proofs offered; nor can there be any, which are direct; because the assertion relates to what passes, and hath passed these many years, in the hearts of the king, queen and ministers of Spain. It is a fact, which we are to take on the bare word of this author, or to reject. I make no scruple of rejecting it, because the probable reasons against it seem to me of much greater weight than his single authority in any case, and especially in a case of this nature. The Spaniards were certainly not very well pleased with us for destroying their fleet. But doth it follow from hence, that the resentment which they conceived upon this occasion, operates thus strongly still? How often were the French beaten by us in the last war? Were not whole squadrons of their ships destroyed? How many of their armies were defeated? How many of their towns were taken? Notwithstanding which, we see with pleasure, the most perfect harmony, the most intimate friendship, subsist between their court and ours; even from the time, when their disgraces were recent, and when their resentments against us must have run the highest, if it was true that resentment, and not the Ragione di Stato, as the Italians call it, governed the conduct of princes. But the Spaniards are



more vindicative than the French. This may be said perhaps by people, who are apt to support one affirmation by another, and to call that proof. But then how came it to pass, that the Spaniards were so soon reconciled to the French, and entered into such close alliances with them immediately after the campaign of 1718? If the British arms beat the Spanish fleet, the French arms took the Spanish towns at the same time. The near relation, and the antient friendship between the two courts of France and Spain, it may be said again, rendered their reconciliation easy. But this would be to suppose what is quite contrary to the natural course of human passions. According to that, the court of Spain must have been infinitely more piqued against their own family, for joining in opposition to them with the emperor, who had been so long their common enemy, than against the court of Britain, who had not the same ties to them, and who acted for an old ally. This is natural and probable. Nay, when we consider how many marks of the utmost resentment were shewn at that time by the Spanish to the French court; how many intrigues the former carried on to subvert the government, and to raise a rebellion in France; I think we may justify affirming that this is true in fact. And yet how soon was all this forgot at Madrid? How soon was the reunion of the two courts brought about in the closest manner, and cemented by marriages?

The king and queen of Spain might look on the proceedings of the French, in this affair, as a political quarrel, and a national wrong; but they looked on an affair, which happened a few years afterwards, as a personal injury and affront. I mean the sending back the infanta in so abrupt, so unprepared a manner, without any softening, and with so many aggravating circumstances. Never resentment run higher, nor was expressed in terms of greater passion, than that

that of the court of Madrid upon this occasion; and yet one or two sacrifices, a little address, and a little management pacified all; united the two courts again; and restored to the French, in a short time, such an influence in Spain, that it is marvellous we, who depend so much upon it, should not yet have found the least effect from it in our favor.

I HAVE dwelt on these observations, in order to shew to what poor expedients those writers are reduced, who attribute the present obstinacy of the Spaniards to the beating their fleet above nine years ago. Surely it is strange that the cardinal DE FLEURY should have been able, in seven or eight months time, to re-establish a good correspondence and friendship between the two courts of France and Spain, after so great and so sensible an affront as PHILIP and his queen thought was put upon them by his predecessor in the ministry; and that our ministers should not be able, in the course of as many years, to atone for what their predecessors did; nor to pacify the resentment of the Spaniards, for their loss of the fleet in an action, which they might have avoided; and which they rendered, in some sort, unavoidable to us. It is impossible to believe, that such an incident should produce these effects; which seem to strengthen, rather than to grow weaker, the farther they are removed from this supposed cause of them. There must be something more recent than this anger, at a loss long since sustained and repaired too, as I believe. Perhaps we may begin to make some discovery of this kind, when we examine the next article; to which I shall proceed as soon as I have made a few reflections more on this head, which PUBLICOLA most prudently suggests to me, and which will be of wonderful service to his cause.

“Nor does the quadruple alliance” (says he; but he must mean the king of Spain’s accession to this alliance) “being after the “promise” (that is, lord STANHOPE’S promise or overture, concerning Gibraltar) “prove the Spaniards had given up their expectations founded on that promise; but only that they were “not, at that time, in proper circumstances to insist upon it.” I have shewn how silly it is to talk of expectations, without any right to expect; and how the right of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, acquired by lord STANHOPE’S promise, or overture, either real or supposed, was extinguished before the year 1721. But I agree, that if they had then had even a real right, they must have submitted to give it up, as they did at that time, because of the circumstances into which they were fallen. Let me ask Mr. PUBLICOLA what reduced them to these circumstances? He must answer, it was beating their fleet. They had been as obstinate before that time as it is possible for them to be now. ALBERONI talked at least as high as the marquis DE LA PAZ. But they grew complying as soon as this hostility was committed. Might not the taking their galleons have had the same effect lately? Would not our incomparable ministers, who run up and down the world negotiating and making treaties, with so much credit to themselves, and so much honor and advantage to the nation, have done better (I speak it with due submission to their approved wisdom) to imitate than to blame the conduct of their predecessors? From 1721 to 1725, we heard of nothing but the happy and flourishing state of our affairs. This must have been owing, according to PUBLICOLA, to the circumstances the Spaniards were in; and therefore this must have been owing to the defeat which they received in the Mediterranean. How came we to hear from the very same persons, that all our difficulties and the distresses we are in at present, ought to be dated before

fore the year 1721? Surely, to be in a flourishing state, a nation must be in a secure state; and how could that be true, if, during the four years I have mentioned, a powerful neighbour meditated revenge, and only waited an opportunity of striking home? How could it be declared, even from the throne, that \* nothing more than the forms of a congress were wanting to establish the public tranquility, if the grand quarrel between us and Spain did, in effect, subsist at that time?

THERE are people so very regardless of truth, and so very indifferent to the shame of being convicted of falsehood, that they never consider, when they affirm a fact, any thing more than the present expediency. Strange, almost incredible instances of this might be quoted. I pass them over in silence for many reasons; and, amongst others, for this reason, that some of them are too recent to be forgot. I stick to the point before me; and shall conclude it by observing that when PUBLICOLA assigns all the difficulties which we have labored under since the year 1725, to what passed before the year 1721, he is confuted not only by the reasons I have urged, which seem to me unanswerable, but likewise by an authority which every man will allow to be decisive.

THE next article to be considered is this. RALEIGH, who was not satisfied with PUBLICOLA's way of accounting for our present difficulties, and for the close alliance between the emperor and Spain, had ascribed both to our refusal of the sole mediation at Cambray. He is accused of maliciously concealing the truth, and of imputing that to ill management, extraordinary refinement and great tenderness, which was the

\* Vide the king's speech at the opening of the session, 1721.

result

result of true reason. Now I think I can demonstrate that PUBLICOLA is ignorant of the truth; or that he conceals it, I will not say corruptly, but unfairly.

THAT the treaty of Vienna was actually and in form signed, before it could be so much as known at Vienna that we had refused the sole mediation, I might grant in one sense, and for the sake of argument, tho I do not believe that the fact is just as he states it; and yet I might safely deny the same thing in the only sense in which this fact can be of the least use to our author. I can grant that this treaty might be signed in form at Vienna, before it could be known there, in form, that we had refused the sole mediation; before the couriers from Cambray to London, from London to Paris, from Paris to Madrid, from Madrid to Vienna could perform their journeys, and the several courts could hold their councils and make their dispatches. But the certain knowledge of our refusing this mediation might very well arrive at Vienna before the treaty was signed; nay, the treaty might be signed upon this knowledge, by virtue of instructions given with this contingency specified in them. I say this might be the case; and therefore to affirm this fact, in the terms PUBLICOLA affirms it, is nothing to the purpose. What RALEIGH advanced may still be true.

THAT full powers were given by Spain to carry on the treaty of Vienna four months before this offer of the mediation, is most certainly true: and therefore there is as much reason to be astonished that early measures were not taken to prevent it, as there is that other measures than what we have seen pursued, were not taken to prevent the effects of such a treaty. Could it be an absolute secret to our ministers, who ought to be well informed; since they have had such immense sums for

for secret service, as were never heard of before their time, that Spain was negotiating at Vienna, during these four months? Could it be a secret to them that, from the death of the duke of ORLEANS, and about a year, at least, before this treaty was concluded, the Spanish ministers were full of fears and jealousies about the completing the infanta's marriage with the king of France? If these things, which were not quite unknown to most private persons, who observed the course of public events, and who sought information about them, did not escape the intelligence of our ministers, how could a consideration of the circumstances, which the court of Spain was in at that period, escape their sagacity?

FROM the time of the accession of the king of Spain to the quadruple alliance, the whole management of the court of Madrid had been left to the duke of ORLEANS and his cardinal DU BOIS; and if we were drawn into the treaty made at Madrid in 1721, by this prince and his minister, as I verily believe we were, it is easy to see who was thanked for this by the Spaniards, and how watchful France hath constantly been to seize and improve every occasion of rendring our title to Gibraltar disputable, and of wresting this important place out of our hands. We came then into the congress of Cambray joint mediators with the French, between the emperor and the king of Spain, but not with equal advantage; not with an equal share in the confidence of one of the parties; and with our share in the confidence of the other, perhaps, a little diminished: for it is not unlikely that the private treaty, made at Madrid with the king of Spain, whilst we were mediators at Cambray between him and the emperor, might give umbrage at least to the latter. I know not whether this step did not even occasion some complaint, tho not in form perhaps, from the imperial ministers.

IN this state of things, and in this disposition of all parties, what could it be imagined that the Spaniards should turn themselves to, on the foresight of a rupture of all intimacy, and even correspondence with France? Could they resolve to leave themselves without any ally with so many enemies, and with their interests still unadjusted? Could they resolve to run the risque, in this condition, of falling back into a state of war, when they were about to purchase peace at a price which they thought so dear? Could they resolve to abandon themselves intirely to Great Britain, who had hitherto shewn so much partiality to the emperor, still their enemy, and whose principal intercourse with them had been managed hitherto by France, to whom they expected soon to become enemies? Certainly they could not resolve upon this, even as I have stated the case; much less could they do so, if they had such an inveterate rancor at heart, as PUBLICOLA represents. What then could our ministers imagine the Spaniards should do upon a foresight of the infanta's being sent back, and by consequence of breaking with France? I will venture to say, for it is plain and evident, that if they thought any thing on this affair, they must think the very thing which the Spaniards did. The Spaniards began to treat at Vienna, that they might prepare for the worst; and they delayed concluding their treaty, till what they feared happened. Give me leave to add, that it was easy to see that, whenever the ministers of PHILIP and the Imperialists should come to examine their master's interest together, they would soon find these interests not so hard to reconcile, nor their want of mediators so great, as they had imagined, whilst rivalry and pique kept them at a distance; and that there were men of great weight in the emperor's court, whose private interest must render them particularly zealous to promote this union. All this happened; and it affords a pregnant instance of what I said above, that  
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reason of state will determine the conduct of princes, not old state resentments.

FROM what hath been thus stated I desire to make some inferences, and to recommend them to PUBLICOLA's consideration.

FIRST then, It appears more ridiculous than ever to talk of the promise of Gibraltar, and the loss of their fleet as lying at the hearts of the Spaniards, and breaking out upon this occasion. Neither must it be said absolutely, that our refusing the sole mediation at Cambray threw Spain into the arms of the emperor. In what respect this step might contribute to it, will be said presently. But the principal and determining cause of Spain's uniting so closely with the emperor, was the sending back the infanta.

SECONDLY, However sudden the immediate resolution for the departure of this princess from France might be; yet this design had been long in agitation; so long, that the suspicion of it had been entertained by the Spaniards, and was even publicly owned by their ministers very many months before they sent their full powers for carrying on a treaty at Vienna.

THIRDLY, There was surely, in the whole progress of this affair, notice enough to alarm any reasonable men, and time enough to prepare for the consequences of a breach between France and Spain. During the life of the duke of ORLEANS, he had, and it could not well be otherwise, the chief credit at Madrid. But it was obvious enough that, by sending back the infanta, his successor would furnish us with a fair opportunity of attempting at least to get between France and Spain, as France had stood between Spain and us, and of



maintaining ourselves in that post. This indeed was an object of the utmost importance, which deserved more than all our negotiations have cost us, and which it is not impossible might have been accomplished for less. Whenever it shall appear that we took all the measures in our power, in a proper manner and at a proper time, for this great end, infinite honor will accrue to our ministers without dispute.

FOURTHLY, If we had been as much prepared as one would think we might in so many months have been, we should have had some great advantages, which, if we were unprepared for these events, and even surpris'd at them, it was impossible we should reap.

THE sole mediation could not indeed have been sooner offer'd than it was; because it could not be offer'd till Spain had broke with France, and then it was offer'd to us. Nay, if it had been offer'd sooner, I agree that we could not have accepted it sooner, for reasons of policy and even of decency. But if we had been prepared for these events, we might have struck a great stroke, as the generality of the world thought, and continue to think, by accepting the mediation in form, as soon as it was offer'd. In the case suppos'd of preparatory measures taken by us, on a foresight of such a conjuncture, it is probable that Spain would not have been extravagant enough to precipitate so bad a bargain as she made for herself in the Vienna treaty. Having no mediator nor even ally, she was under a necessity of granting almost any terms to the emperor, provided she secur'd the main points which she had in view. But, sure of our support, and she might have had assurances sufficient for her to depend upon, it is impossible to think she would have carried her concessions farther than she needed to have done. In this case none of those engagements, which  
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were talked of, but which have never yet appeared so injurious to Britain, could have been taken; and we might have had perhaps the satisfaction of seeing the peace of Europe consummated by the reconciliation of two princes, the adjustment of whose interests had been so long our care, and whose union is, without doubt, in general, and unless some particular circumstances of a very extraordinary nature hinder it, the common advantage of all those who desire to see a balance of power preserved in the western world. But I go farther. I will suppose that we had not been able to soften Spain; or that we had not attempted it, which perhaps was the case; that Spain looked on us with a jealous, and even a revengeful eye; and in short that the mediation was offered to us, without any design that we should concern ourselves in it, and purely for form sake; yet surely, even in this case, some advantage might have been taken by our immediate acceptance of it. Our conduct, at least, would have been free from any objection, and Spain and the emperor would have been left without any color of excuse. Might not such a step have retarded the conclusion of this famous treaty? Might not time have been gained; and would not the least time, in this case, have been of the greatest moment to us?

FIFTHLY, When the mediation was offered us, we could not know how soon the treaty would be signed. It cannot be pretended that we did. Our refusal of it therefore must have been grounded purely on these two considerations, so often urged in defence of this measure, that the Spaniards were our inveterate enemies, and that we were in alliance with the French. What is meant by being in alliance with the French, and making this a distinction between our relation to them and our relation to the Spaniards, I am at a loss to find. We were surely in alliance with one nation, as well as the other, from

the moment the king of Spain acceded to the quadruple alliance, and the matters still unsettled at Cambray were solely relative to him and to the emperor. If it be meant that we thought the French our friends, and knew that the Spaniards waited only for a pretended occasion to break out into enmity with us, I think this reason will prove the very contrary of what it is advanced to prove. Did we suspect that something contrary to our interest, something dangerous to us, was working up in the negotiation of Vienna; and did we for this very reason decline an opportunity of coming at some knowledge of what was in agitation there? did we, for this very reason, refuse the best means we could have hoped for, of keeping our antient friendship with the imperial court, and of being in a condition to check the court of Spain? Such arguments as these will not pass; and whoever produces them hath too mean an opinion of the rest of mankind, and too presumptuous an opinion of his own sufficiency. On the part of France, no objection could have been made to us, if we had accepted this mediation: for either the points to be mediated upon were pure trifles; such as the titles, and other matters of as little weight, referred to the congress of Cambray; in which case our accepting the sole mediation must have been quite indifferent to the French: or these points were of moment to the general interest; and in this case, the French ought to have desired that we should continue in the mediation, for the same reasons which ought to have determined us to do so. If the friendship and confidence between us and the French was not so strict as it hath been represented, they did not deserve the compliment we made them. If this friendship and confidence were so strict, they might and they would have trusted us with pleasure. Every one knows how concerned and alarmed the French were at the resentment which the king of Spain shewed on this occasion. Their first care was to try all possible means

means of pacifying him. If we could have been one of these means, their obligations to, and their confidence in us must have increased. We might have treated for them, when they could not treat for themselves. Instead of this, by dint of management, we so disposed affairs, that the French in a short time treated for us with the emperor and the king of Spain, with whom we could not treat for ourselves.

THE last inference I shall make, from all that hath been said, is this. As sending back the infanta was the certain and immediate cause of throwing Spain into the arms of the emperor; so our refusal of the sole mediation may justly be deemed an accessory cause of it. This refusal might give occasion to carry the engagements of these two princes farther than it was for our interest that they should go. At least, our acceptance of it was the sole, probable measure, in that instant, of preventing such engagements; for this union of the emperor and the king of Spain is not, in itself, so terrible. Spain might be as well, nay better for us and for all Europe, in the arms of the emperor than of France; and if this union is become formidable to us, we may thank for it our own management, through a long series of business, and through divers revolutions of affairs; our too much neglect of Spain; our too much dependence on France; our being, upon all occasions, indefatigably busy about the interests of other people, and leaving to other people the conduct of our own; of which surely a more strange example cannot be imagined than that which is before our eyes. We would not attempt, nay we would not consent to be mediators, when we stood in that character, and could stand in no other, notwithstanding all the reasons for it in that nice conjuncture. Such was our delicacy. But we have admitted and (may be I be allowed to say so?) we have courted France to act as mediator, where she

is a party; for France is a party to the treaty of Hanover; and the treaty of Hanover, with the treaty of Vienna, give occasion jointly to the congress of Soissons, and all the present negotiations.

THAT France is a party in our quarrel, we have been often told; and that she would act as such, we have been often assured. She was to make besieging Gibraltar a *Causus Faederis*. She was to march an army into Rouffillon. What was she not to do?—But we have seen her act hitherto no part but that of a mediator; a common friend; but unconcerned in the quarrel. No good effect hath yet appeared, even from her offices as mediator. If, by these offices, she hath kept us from acting for ourselves, and made us prefer a precarious dependence to a vigorous war, I am sure the effect of her acting in this character hath been a bad one for Britain.

NOTHING can be more plain than that chain of causes and effects, which hath draged us into our present difficulties; and as these difficulties increased, the obstinacy of Spain must of course increase likewise. If that court had never thought of getting Gibraltar out of our hands, the state we brought ourselves into was sufficient to suggest the design to them. When once Spain had purchased the emperor's alliance, (I may use this expression, the treaty of Vienna will justify it) she might flatter herself that he would adhere to her, even in unreasonable expectations, since he had no more to expect from us, and had so much to receive from her. As soon as we had sagely declined having to do with her, or for her, unless in concert with France, with whom she would have nothing to do at that time, France employed all possible means to be reconciled to her. Intrigues of every sort, ecclesiastical and secular, were set on foot. They succeeded; and Spain  
saw

law she had nothing to apprehend. What she had to hope, I determine not, from this party to the Hanover treaty. The other princes and states, who acceded to this treaty, acceded in such a manner, as it is easy to prove, if PUBLICOLA should think fit to deny it, that we could have little to hope and Spain little to apprehend from their engagements, in her disputes with us about our immediate interests.

ALL other powers softened towards each other by degrees; and by degrees we got deeper into the quarrel. Spain, from having no ally, came to have many; some more, some less to be depended on; none to be feared. From having a multitude of disputes, she came to have none, except with us. We, on the other hand, from having none of our interests in dispute, are come to see hardly any others in controversy. From feeling ourselves backed by several allies, we are come, at least in the points of direct relation to us, to have in effect no ally but one; and with that one we own that we are dissatisfied; nay we own that we are afraid of him. The writer, I am answering, insinuates both; nay, he does it almost in express words. He complains of the indifference of France in support of our interests; and of the danger of engaging in a war, in concert with France. Who would have thought it, Mr. D'ANVERS? Here is the London Journal contradicting the Enquiry; and I am able to point out to you many gross instances of his doing the same thing. Here is PUBLICOLA accounting for our present difficulties, now they are come upon us, by the very arguments which were urged against the Hanover treaty, and which proved that the natural consequence of that treaty was just what the event hath shewn it to be. Those who wrote against the Enquiry foretold what would happen. PUBLICOLA justifies the ministry, by complaining that it hath happened!

I WILL mention but one instance more of this kind; and that shall be with relation to the Ostend company. "The grand quarrel, says PUBLICOLA, was between us and Spain. The Ostend trade, about which such a noise hath been made, was more the concern of our neighbors, both by treaty and interest, than our own."---Now I will leave the world to decide by whom all this noise about the Ostend trade hath been made. Did not you, Mr. D'ANVERS, and several other writers, maintain that this company was of but little concern to us, in opposition to the whole party on the contrary side, who took all possible pains, both within doors and without, to prove that the Ostend trade was a point of the utmost concern to Britain, and even equal to Gibraltar itself? Nay, the author of the Enquiry, who hath now the mortification to see himself given up, in every material article, by both parties; even by those who set him to work, goes so far, p. 57. of that memorable performance, as to assert that Gibraltar would be of no importance to us, if the Ostend company should be suffered to subsist; and having labored that point, with all his strength, for no less than twenty pages together, concludes it thus: "That not only our own East and West India trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruined by the Ostend company, which will be the immediate effect of it, or rather is so already in some degree, but also that the contagion will spread to many other branches of the British and Dutch trade; and convey along with it the riches, the strength and the naval power to the same Spanish Netherlands.

"But were it so that Holland alone would be the sufferer by the Ostend trade, which is far from being the case, yet the ruin of Holland must carry along with it, in the end, the ruin of Britain."

SUCH

SUCH absurdities as these would provoke merriment in a case of less consequence; but they provoke indignation in a case where the honor and interest of our king and country are so deeply concerned.

INTO this state were our foreign affairs brought, when his present majesty came to the crown. I mention this the rather, because they, who now think it for their interest to date the rise of all this mischief so much backwarder than it can consistently with truth be dated, may possibly find it for their interest hereafter, if new and almost unavoidable difficulties should come upon us, in consequence of what they have done in a former reign, to date the rise of them as much too forward. Let it then be remembered that all which hath happened in this reign, is no more than a prolongation of the same scene. The great scenes of the world are not to be shifted at our pleasure. They must be continued sometimes, when we are convinced the most that they are weakly framed. Opportunities must be waited for, and we trust they will happen. We are sure they will be improved by the capacity, the vigor, the experience and valor of our august monarch. A seasonable and powerful effort hath often broke through the most complicated evils. A word hath often effected what the most tedious negotiations, such as we have been accustomed to, could never have brought about.

I HAVE now done with Mr. PUBLICOLA for this time; and I hope for good and all. If my letter is grown into a greater length than I designed, this hath been owing principally to an earnest desire of setting these matters (so often and so grossly misrepresented) in a just and clear light. I have advanced no facts but such as are of public notoriety, such as I know to be true, and such as I do verily believe to be so, upon such



grounds as reasonable men have always thought sufficient to constitute, in cases of this nature, the highest probability. I have endeavored to push no consequence, nor to strain any argument farther than I judged it would evidently bear; for whatever PUBLICOLA may think, which concerns me little, I assure you, Mr. D'ANVERS, that I would not have given myself this trouble, small as it is, of answering him for any other reason but this; that, in order to get well out of our present difficulties and dangers, it is necessary to know truly how we came into them; and that he therefore, who contributes to dispel from before the eyes of mankind those mists of error which are so industriously raised at this time, does some service to his king and his country.

I am, SIR, &c.

JOHN TROT.

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