Secure use of open-source software : a systematic study and techniques for Java / Andreas Peter Dann ; Advisors: Prof. Dr. Eric Bodden, Prof. Dr. Ben Hermann. Paderborn, 2024
Inhalt
- Abstract
- Acknowledgments
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Research Challenges
- 1.2 Thesis Contributions
- 1.3 Generality of Contributions
- 1.4 Thesis Structure
- 2 Background
- 2.1 Terminology & Dependency Management in Java
- 2.2 Dependency Management in Other Programming Languages
- 3 Systematic Study on the Usage of Open-Source Software and Challenges for Their Detection
- 3.1 Strategies for Detecting Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Software
- 3.2 Study Design
- 3.3 Use of Open-Source Software at SAP
- 3.3.1 RQ1: What Are Practices for Using Open-Source Software at SAP?
- 3.3.2 RQ2: What Vulnerabilities Affect the 20 Most-Used Dependencies?
- 3.3.3 RQ3: How Do Developers Include Open-Source Software?
- 3.4 Prevalence & Impact of Modified Open-Source Software
- 3.4.1 RQ4: How Prominent Are the Modifications Outside SAP?
- 3.4.2 RQ5: What Is the Impact of the Modifications on Vulnerability Scanners?
- 3.5 Study Summary
- 3.6 Threats to Validity
- 3.7 Achilles: Test Suite for Detecting Modified Open-Source Software
- 3.7.1 Diverse Real-World Applications
- 3.7.2 Detecting Vulnerable Open-Source Software
- 3.7.3 Automation and Ease of Use
- 3.7.4 Organization and Distribution
- 3.8 SootDiff: An Approach for Identifying Modified Open-Source Software
- 3.8.1 Dissimilarities Introduced by Java Compilers
- 3.8.2 Jimple: Intermediate Bytecode Representation
- 3.8.3 Compare Modified Bytecode
- 3.8.4 Evaluation
- 3.9 Related Work
- 3.9.1 Case Studies: Use of Vulnerable Open-Source Software
- 3.9.2 Test Suites: Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Software
- 3.9.3 Code Clone Detection
- 3.10 Conclusion
- 4 An Automated Approach for Safely Updating Included Open-Source Software
- 4.1 Safe Backward Compatible Updates
- 4.1.1 Dependency Graph Updates
- 4.1.2 Source and Binary Compatibility
- 4.1.3 Semantic Compatibility
- 4.1.4 Blossom Compatibility
- 4.2 UpCy: Identify Safe Backward Compatible Updates
- 4.3 Evaluation
- 4.4 Threats to Validity
- 4.5 Related Work
- 4.5.1 Studies: How Developers Update (Vulnerable) Dependencies
- 4.5.2 Update Compatibility Analysis
- 4.5.3 Repository Dependency Graphs
- 4.6 Conclusion
- 5 Securely Integrating Open-Source Software with Java's Module System
- 5.1 Java's Security Architecture & Module System
- 5.1.1 Java 1.2 Security Model
- 5.1.2 The Java Platform Module System
- 5.1.3 Motivating Example of Sensitive Entities Escaping a Module
- 5.1.4 Excursion: The OSGi Platform
- 5.2 Precisely Defining a Module's Entry Points
- 5.2.1 Explicitly vs. Implicitly Reachable Entry Points
- 5.2.2 Logic-based Specification of the Entry-Point Model
- 5.2.3 Limitations of the Entry-Point Model
- 5.3 ModGuard: Identify Confidentiality or Integrity Violations of Modules
- 5.4 Evaluation
- 5.4.1 Research Questions
- 5.4.2 Study Objects
- 5.4.3 Results
- 5.4.4 Case Study: CVE-2017-5648 in Tomcat (modules)
- 5.5 Limitations of Modules for the Secure Integration of Open-Source Software
- 5.6 Related Work
- 5.6.1 Sandboxes for Native Code
- 5.6.2 Encapsulation and Isolation of OSGi Bundles
- 5.6.3 Escape Analysis
- 5.6.4 Information-Flow Control
- 5.7 Conclusion
- 6 Conclusion and Outlook
- Implementations and Data
- Bibliography
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Listings