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Denomination / Determination in Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848–1922)

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E.E. Constance Jones acknowledges only two logical forms: ' S is P ' and ' S is not P '. The terms S and P can be such expressions as 'all men', 'some dogs', 'courage', 'cowardice', 'Tully' or 'Cicero' (Jones 1893–94: 36). Here Jones's view differs from the tradition, where for example 'all' and 'some' are not part of the terms themselves.

In every term, Jones distinguishes two aspects. The *denomination* corresponds to the *existence* of the thing to which the term applies; the *determination* corresponds to the thing's *character* (Jones 1890: 196–97).

Jones initially avoids the use of the more familiar 'denotation' and 'connotation', or 'extension' and 'intension' (see *Intension / Extension*) for two reasons: (1) these terms have been employed in confusing ways, and (2) "no use of those terms that [she is] acquainted with corresponds to the distinction which [she has] in view" (Jones 1890: 8, note 2; cf. *ibid.*: 9).

Regarding (1), Jones takes issue with the employment especially of 'connotation'. The connotation of a (general or proper) name N has been interpreted as *all* the attributes or properties common to the denotation of N , and also as only those attributes which are independent of one another. Jones finds both positions problematic (Jones 1890: 35). However, it is not quite clear how using 'determination' solves the problems.

Regarding (2), although Jones's views resemble those of nineteenth century logicians, she stresses that "the exact points of difference ... are all-important" (Jones 1910–1911: 166). By the latter she means her analysis of ' S is P ', for which the distinction between denomination and determination is crucial (see *Law of Significant Assertion*).

Later, Jones appears to have dropped her qualms about using 'denotation' and 'connotation', perhaps because she encountered a view that she felt *did* express clearly what she meant: "It does seem to me ... that Prof. Frege's general Analysis of Categorials (published in 1892) [...] is the same as mine" and "I could not feel sure that *any one* (until I became aware of Frege) did accept *precisely* my analysis" (Jones 1915: 61).

Primary Sources:

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