



Judgment in Dorothy Wrinch (1894–1976)

Giulia Felappi

University of Southampton

According to the standard view, judgment is a two-place relation, holding between the subject of the judgment and the object of the judgment, a proposition. According to the simplest version of the *multiple relation theory of judgment*, first put forward by Russell (1906: 46; 1913), judgment is instead a multiple relation. For example, A's judgment that B loves C is not a relation between A and the proposition *that B loves C*, but rather a relation among A, B, C, and the relation of love.

In its simplest form, the multiple relation theory is notoriously subject to an objection, stemming from considering molecular judgments, such as A's judgment that if B is rude, C is upset. If the judgment is a relation holding among A, B, C, the property of being rude and the property of being upset, we cannot distinguish it from other judgments that are obviously different, such as the judgment that B is rude and C is upset.

To overcome the objection, Dorothy Wrinch suggested that “the *form* of the proposition be introduced” (1919: 321). According to Wrinch's version of the multiple relation theory of judgment, which she takes to be identical to belief (1920: 52f1), A's judgment that if B is rude, C is upset can be analysed as having as components A, B, C, the property of being rude, the property of being upset, the logical form $fx \supset gy$, and the evaluator (1919: 321) that assigns x to B, y to C, f to being rude and g to being upset. Wrinch's version of the multiple relation theory can distinguish different molecular judgments, as A's judgment that B is rude and C is upset has as one of the relata not the logical form $fx \supset gy$, but rather the logical form $fx.gy$.

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