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Since 2001, when energy tycoon Enron and its auditor Arthur Andersen caused one of the biggest corporate scandals in the history of the U.S. economy due to a manipulation of Enrons balance sheets, Corporate Compliance instruments to prevent occupational fraud have been on the rise globally.As a result of even further corporate scandals in the following years, the U.S. government introduced various laws for companies doing business in or with the United States of America. These laws legally mandated e.g. the implementation of a host of internal controls to prevent and/or detect fraud. But despite the laws, various further big corporate scandals have erupted organizations, the media and the public over the last couple of years. To name only three: (1) the Libor manipulation at Deutsche Bank and other global banks in the finance industry of 2012, (2) the country-rigging scandal at the oil giant Petrobras in Brazil of 2014 or (3) the emissions scandal (“Dieselgate”) scandal at Volkswagen and other global car manufactures of 2015. These above-mentioned corporate scandals are just three cases exemplifying that Corporate Compliance runs short on protecting companies and shareholders from self-seeking fraudsters because all of these aforementioned examples had compliance monitoring systems in place. Therefore, it is about time to rethink Corporate Compliance to prevent occupational fraud more effectively.This dissertation sets the ground for a behavior-oriented compliance (Behavioral Compliance) and aims at helping Corporate Compliance to be more effective in occupational fraud prevention and detection. But how? By taking a closer look at those people who (1) commit fraud (fraudsters, non-compliant) and (2) report fraud (whistleblowers, compliant). Learning about the motivation leading to their behavior will provide useful insights for fraud prevention and detection.