Riach, John: The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure within the framework of the failed Daimler-Benz Welt AG strategy. 2013
Inhalt
- INDEX OF TABLES
- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 2 THE GOALS AND RATIONALE FOR THE TAKEOVER
- 2.1 Reasons for optimism
- 2.1.1 Initial DaimlerChrysler AG facts and figures
- 2.1.2 Initial stock market reaction
- 2.1.3 The reaction of the respective boards
- 2.1.4 The reaction of the unions
- 2.1.5 The reaction of the financial analysts
- 2.1.6 The reaction of the politicians
- 2.1.7 The reaction of the shareholders
- 2.1.8 The reaction of industry experts
- 2.1.9 The reaction of the press
- 2.2 Historical merger and takeover precedents at Daimler and Chrysler
- 2.3 The car industry in the 1990s: lean production and merger frenzy
- 2.4 Conclusions
- 3 CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
- 3.1 The literature on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover
- 3.2 Can intercultural differences explain the takeover failure?
- 3.2.1 The car industry: A global and national phenomenon
- 3.2.2 Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensions
- 3.2.3 Hofstede applied to the takeover failure
- 3.3 Was the takeover a conflict between Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)?
- 3.4 Conclusions
- 4 EMERGENCE OF DB’S WELT AG STRATEGY (1983-1998)
- 4.1 Shift from craft to mass production
- 4.2 The MIT study and the creation of a new industry paradigm
- 4.2.1 MIT study impact on Daimler-Benz strategy
- 4.2.2 The “quality” strategy: Daimler-Benz
- 4.2.3 The “innovation and flexibility” strategy: Chrysler
- 4.3 Diversification at Daimler-Benz
- 4.4 The emergence of Schrempp’s expanded Welt AG strategy
- 4.4.1 The fight for control of Mercedes inside Daimler (1995-1997)
- 4.4.2 Die Welt AG
- 4.4.3 The impact of shareholder value at Daimler-Benz
- 4.4.4 Mercedes as the focal point of the Welt AG strategy
- 4.5 Chrysler’s motivation to merge
- 4.6 Conclusions
- 5 MEASURING THE TAKEOVER FAILURE
- This chapter focuses on measuring the extent to which DaimlerChrysler AG failed to meet the three most important goals outlined by CEO Jürgen Schrempp in May 1998:
- 5.1 Financial failure to increase shareholder value
- 5.1.1 DCX: The first truly global share
- 5.1.2 The Standard and Poor’s 500 mistake
- 5.1.3 The resiliency of national institutions
- Germany is generally viewed as a classical non-shareholder value economy and consciously rejects the “Anglo-Saxon approach”, which places high value both on shareholder value and the salience of equity markets as critical tools of corporate governanc...
- The general situation escalated when the Securities and Exchange Commission, the control instrument for the New York Stock Exchange and the United States government started investigating DaimlerChrsyler for bribery and other illegal trading practices ...
- 5.1.4 DCX after Schrempp
- 5.2 If Mercedes knew what Mercedes knew: lack of standards
- 5.2.1 The Executive Automotive Committee and brand protection
- 5.2.2 Marketing and the last attempt to merge
- 5.3 DaimlerChrysler AG and quality issues
- 5.3.1 Measuring quality
- 5.3.2 DaimlerChrysler AG and Mercedes quality
- 5.3.3 M-Class quality issues
- 5.3.4 E-Class quality issues
- 5.3.5 Mercedes and J.D. Power
- 5.3.6 Mercedes vs. Consumers Report
- 5.4 Failed Welt AG strategy
- 5.5 Conclusions
- 6 THE “MERGER OF EQUALS” LIE AND TRUST
- 6.1 Semantic differences between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers
- 6.2 Strategies for post-merger outcomes; the “merger of equals” dilemma
- 6.3 Differing organizational culture and trust at DaimlerChrysler AG
- 6.3.1 An economic framework for organizational culture
- 6.3.2 Conflicting cultures cannot explaining takeover failures
- 6.3.3 The Daimler-Benz culture: pride and arrogance
- 6.4 Social capital and the takeover failure
- 6.4.1 Lack of trust after the takeover
- 6.4.2 Destruction of networks after the takeover
- 6.4.3 Negative space and time after the takeover
- 6.5 Stories at the core of the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure
- 6.5.1 Institutionalized disloyalty at Chrysler
- 6.5.2 The Mercedes brand and a culture of pride and arrogance
- 6.5.3 The M-Class synergy failure story
- 6.6 Conclusions
- 7 LESSONS LEARNT
- 7.1 Methodology
- 7.2 Merger and acquisition strategies
- 7.3 Cross-border M&As and intercultural differences
- 7.4 Cross-border M&As and interorganizational differences
- 7.5 Trust and communication as key implementation tools
- 7.6 It is premature to talk about truly global companies
- 7.7 The myth of shareholder value
- 7.8 Academic research in the automobile industry
- 7.9 Varieties of Capitalism
- 7.10 Limits of this research
- Literature References
- Appendices
- EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG